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Executive summary 
The integration of young people into the labour market has been subject to a great 
deal of research over the last decade. This increased attention is primarily caused by 
the persistently high levels of youth unemployment in Europe since the eighties. 
Furthermore, increasing globalisation and competitiveness, in combination with rapid 
technological changes, have made education and training in modern societies of 
increasing importance in the social stratification process and as an economic growth 
factor. The underlying sources of problems faced by young people during the 
transition from school to work in different European countries are difficult to 
disentangle. Policy interventions can only be successful if one understands the 
particular features of the transition from school to work in different European 
education and employment structures. This raises the need for an institutional 
framework that helps to determine the factors affecting success and failure in the 
labour market integration of youngsters. 
 
This study intends to define a set of adequate key indicators that makes it possible to 
evaluate the integration of young people into the labour market within the European 
Union. These indicators are related to differences in the institutional arrangements 
that constrain the school-to-work transition patterns in the Member States. The aim is 
to highlight similarities and differences in the integration process between the various 
countries and to relate these to national institutional differences. 
 
In developing key indicators concerning the school-to-work transition, it is important 
that these indicators are comparable between countries and between years. This 
implies that structural factors affecting the integration of young people into the labour 
market have to be taken into account. 
 
Firstly, the integration process depends on the speed with which the labour market 
absorbs school-leavers. This absorption power is influenced by national institutional 
differences with regard to industrial relations. Because labour market regulations 
differ between countries, the absorption power does too. The insider-outsider theory 
appears very promising and interesting in this respect. In this study, the particular 
interest is in the effects of wage bargaining, trade union power and employment 
protection legislation on the integration process. In addition, attention is paid on the 
effects of active youth labour market policies. 
 
Secondly, differences related to institutional arrangements in education and training 
systems affect the transition from school to work. Following recent theoretical 
considerations, three aspects of national institutional contexts related to education 
and training systems are distinguished: diversity in the institutional linkage between 
the education/training system and the employment system, differences in the degree 
of standardisation and stratification in curricular/pedagogical and examination/ 
certification terms, and variation in the expansion of the education system. 
 
Thirdly, labour market conditions differ between countries within the European Union. 
Some countries can go through a recession whereas others can be in the middle of 
 iv 
an upturn at the same time. To prevent differences in the general labour market 
situation of countries to play a disturbing role in determining the impact of national 
institutional contexts of the employment and the education/training systems on the 
integration process of young people into the labour market, the effect of the business 
cycle has to be taken into account.  
  
For the construction of key indicators, the European Community Labour Force 
Survey (ECLFS) data set is used. This cross-sectional data set combines the original 
Labour Force Surveys (LFS) as held by the individual Member States. This pooled 
data set, which consists of information covering the period 1992-1997, is the best 
one available at the moment to address the issue of the transition from school to 
work in Europe. 
 
On the basis of the ECLFS data set, four key indicators are developed to describe 
the (lack of) integration of young people into the labour market: being out of the 
labour force, being unemployed, having a temporary job, and having a part-time job. 
Although these four indicators do not give full insight into the integration process of 
school-leavers, they give at least a good indication. This is due to the rather limited 
availability of key indicators with regard to the transition from school to work in the 
ECLFS data set. 
 
The method used for estimating differences in youth labour market performance 
between countries is multilevel analysis. To determine cross-country differences in 
the labour market performance of young people, adequate statistical control for 
variation within countries between years and individuals is necessary. There is 
consensus that the use of aggregate data to control for these input characteristics 
leads to misspecification of the true differences. Using aggregate cross-country data 
will therefore produce performance scores of which the meaning and validity are 
highly questionable. Instead, data at the individual level is necessary. The basic idea 
in multilevel analysis is that individual labour market outcomes are predicted on the 
basis of personal characteristics (such as the level of education attained), and 
contextual variables (to explain differences between years and countries). For the 
analysis applied in this study, the individual pooled data from the ECLFS data set are 
matched with aggregate time series that measure differences in industrial relations, 
institutional contexts with regard to the education/training system and general labour 
market conditions between the countries of the European Union. 
 
The results of multilevel analysis show that the labour market integration of young 
people within the European Union is indeed systematically structured by national 
institutional contexts. With regard to national institutional factors concerning labour 
market regulations, it is primarily the employment protection of the existing labour 
force that has a damaging effect on the integration process of youngsters. In 
countries with a less strict employment protection legislation, school-leavers find a 
(stable) labour market position more easily than in countries with a high strictness of 
employment protection. In addition, the wage bargaining structure plays a role, with 
centralised/co-ordinated systems performing better than decentralised/unco-ordi-
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nated ones in terms of unemployment among school-leavers. These two findings 
confirm empirically the supposed insider-outsider dichotomy in the labour market. 
 
With regard to institutional characteristics of education and training systems, it is 
clear that the presence of an extensive dual system - as a workplace-based 
vocational training system - improves the transition from school to work in a country. 
The positive effect of having a dual system on the labour market integration of 
youngsters stems from the strong allocation function of the dual system: the 
institutionalised pathway it provides for young people to enter the labour market. The 
effect does not seem so much to be related to the more vocational orientation of 
countries with a dual system, since the results of this study show that the specificity 
of vocational education does not play an important role in the integration process. 
The stratification of the education system neither has an impact on the transition from 
school to work. 
 
Furthermore, it turned out that the indicators for the measurement of youth labour 
market integration show quite similar results and are, therefore, coherent key 
indicators. Only with respect to part-time employment it seems that this labour market 
outcome is a less appropriate indicator. First of all, the cross-country variation 
regarding part-time employment could not be explained by the factors that are - to a 
large extent - responsible for the country differences with respect to the other 
indicators. Part-time employment among young people in a country is neither 
influenced by general labour market conditions nor by the degree of employment 
protection legislation and/or the provision of a dual system in that country. In addition, 
part-time employment is hardly correlated at the country level with the other 
indicators for the integration of young people into the labour market, whereas these 
other indicators are fairly strong interrelated. This suggests that a high percentage of 
part-time work in a country is not a characteristic of the youth labour market, but a 
more generalised feature of the labour market of that country. 
 
Lastly, we should mention a certain limitation of this study. Due to the rather limited 
availability of adequate key indicators in the data set used, we could not give a 
complete picture of the integration process of school-leavers into the labour market. 
Firstly, information on wages is lacking. Secondly, job match or skill use 
characteristics are missing. For instance, it was not possible to determine whether 
the actual level of education held by school-leavers fits with the theoretical level of 
education requested by the job (‘overeducation’). Thirdly, information on labour 
mobility is not available. Since school-leavers often start in jobs that do not match 
their education, job mobility is considerable among them. Therefore, in future 
research it would be very interesting to investigate whether national institutional 
contexts affect these other indicators of youth labour market integration. However, 
this kind of information requires other comparative data sources that are 
unfortunately not available (yet). 
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1 Introduction 
The transition from school to work has been a major research topic over the last ten 
years (for an overview, see Hannan and Werquin (1999) and Ryan (2001)). The main 
reason for this attention is the occurrence of persistently high youth unemployment 
rates in Europe since the eighties. A considerable proportion of young people is 
unemployed in the period after leaving school, and even the youngsters who 
immediately find a job, are often working in vulnerable positions. This makes the 
integration process of young people into the labour market far from smooth and the 
transition from school to work can therefore be characterised as a precarious and 
uncertain period for young people (OECD, 1998: 111). To overcome this social 
problem, policy makers have focused a lot of attention on the integration of young 
people into the labour market by means of substantial state investments to improve 
the transition from school to work. Originally, these investments occurred in rather 
indirect labour market interventions such as employment and training programmes. 
Only recently, more active interventions have been taken, for instance in the form of 
subsidised jobs. 
 
In addition, globalisation and competitiveness have made policy makers aware that 
education and training - i.e. human capital growth - is of increasing importance as an 
economic growth factor (see the EU Commission’s White Paper (1993)). Human 
capital determines the productivity level of the labour force. The productivity level 
attained in the labour market is an important factor which influences the 
competitiveness of a country. Especially an education/training system - as the most 
important provider of human capital - that wants to fulfil the requirements of the 
labour market, needs to take care of the level of knowledge and skills of the youth 
labour force, since young people are very useful to firms in need of highly qualified, 
new personnel. Besides that, a well-functioning education system seems vital in a 
labour market characterised by rapid technological changes.  
 
The underlying sources of problems faced by young people during the transition from 
school to work in different European countries are difficult to disentangle. Policy 
interventions can only be successful if one understands the particular features of the 
transition from school to work in different European education and employment 
structures. This creates the need for an institutional framework that helps to 
determine the factors affecting success and failure in the labour market integration of 
youth. The European Commission’s Directorate-General for Employment and Social 
Affairs entitled us to evaluate the performance of Member States with regard to the 
integration process of young people into the labour market. To evaluate, we 
introduce key indicators. These indicators are used as summary statistics for 
measuring the performance of a system (Tuynman and Potslethwaite, 1994; OECD 
1995). In this case, the use of key indicators enables policy makers to assess 
differences in performance with regard to the integration of youngsters into the labour 
market, by enabling a systematic comparison, between countries and between years. 
 
In this study, we aim at developing a set of key indicators that enables to evaluate 
the integration process of young people into the labour market. These indicators will 
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be related to differences in the institutional arrangements that constrain the school-
to-work transition patterns in the Member States. The aim is to highlight similarities 
and differences in the integration patterns between the various countries and to 
relate these to national institutional differences. 
 
Key indicators should meet three criteria. Firstly, key indicators should be a good 
reflection of reality at a glance, i.e. a limited number of statistics should cover the 
different aspects of young people’s integration into the labour market. To create 
these indicators, we will use the European Community Labour Force Survey 
(ECLFS) data. The ECLFS constitutes the best available data set in this respect, 
because of its scale and its comparability between Member States. The ECLFS 
contains some of the most important indicators on young people’s integration pattern, 
such as labour force participation, unemployment, permanency of jobs, et cetera. On 
the basis of this data set, we will construct the key indicators needed to describe the 
transition from education to work for young people within the European Union. 
 
Secondly, key indicators that measure the transition pattern should be comparable 
between countries and between years. This means that we have to take into account 
structural factors that influence the integration process of youngsters into the labour 
market. A first possible source of structural factors that affect the integration of young 
people into the labour market arises from national institutional differences with regard 
to industrial relations. The integration of youngsters into the labour market (partially) 
depends on the speed with which the labour market absorbs school-leavers. This 
absorption power may be influenced by industrial relations. Because labour market 
regulations differ between countries, the absorption power does too. The insider-
outsider theory appears very promising and interesting for our concern. For this 
purpose, we are particularly interested in the effects of employment protection 
legislation, union power and wage bargaining on the integration process. In addition, 
the effects of active youth labour market policies on the transition from school to work 
are relevant. 
 
Whereas differences related to industrial relations influence the integration of young 
people into the labour market from the labour demand side, differences related to 
institutional arrangements in education and training systems affect the transition from 
school to work from the supply side. School-leavers who have passed through 
education systems that provide ‘tailor-made’ education - i.e. education in which pupils 
acquire a set of qualifications that match employers’ needs -, are considered to be 
more attractive to employers to hire than others. Following recent theoretical 
considerations, we distinguish three aspects of national institutional contexts related 
to education and training systems: diversity in the institutional linkage between the 
education/training system and the employment system, differences in the degree of 
standardisation and stratification in curricular/pedagogical and examination/ 
certification terms, and variation in the expansion of the education system. 
 
Labour market conditions differ between countries within the European Union. Some 
countries may go through a recession, whereas others can be in the middle of an 
upturn at the same time. Of course, macroeconomic conditions play a role with 
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regard to the extent and speed of the labour market integration of school-leavers. To 
prevent differences in the general labour market situation playing a disturbing role in 
determining the impact of national institutional contexts of both the employment and 
the education/training system on the integration process, we have to take the effect 
of the business cycle into account.  
 
Thirdly, key indicators should be interpretable not only quantitatively but also 
qualitatively. To be able to interpret these indicators qualitatively, we will use 
benchmarking tools. Benchmarking enables us to put the various results arising from 
the key indicators into perspective. That is, we determine differences in the youth 
labour market performance between countries on the basis of appropriate key 
indicators. 
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2 Theoretical background 
As already mentioned above, increasing globalisation and competitiveness, in 
combination with rapid technological changes, have made education and training in 
modern societies of increasing importance in the social stratification process and as 
an economic growth factor. The way societies deal with these developments differs. 
Countries vary in the institutional arrangements that constrain the transition from 
education to work (Kerckhoff, 1995). In this chapter, we formulate a set of 
hypotheses that give a provisional answer to the question how national institutional 
arrangements, both with regard to industrial relations and the education/training 
system, influence the integration of young people into the labour market within the 
European Union. This set of hypotheses will be empirically tested in Chapter 5 of this 
study, in which we link the key indicators with the national institutional contexts with 
regard to the employment system and the education/training system. 
 
2.1 National institutional factors related to industrial relations 
2.1.1 Insiders versus outsiders 
The integration of youngsters into the labour market strongly depends on the extent 
to which the labour market absorbs school-leavers (OECD, 1998: Chapter 3). The 
insider-outsider theory appears very promising and interesting in this respect 
(Lindbeck and Snower, 1988). As its name indicates, this theory relies on the 
distinction between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’. Employed workers are insiders and 
unemployed workers are, in general, referred to as outsiders. However, a specific 
group of outsiders consists of labour market entrants (DeVreyer, Layte, Wolbers and 
Hussain, 2000), since school-leavers without any work experience have to compete 
for available jobs with those who have already gained a position on the labour 
market. According to the insider-outsider theory, wage bargaining takes place 
between insiders and employers. Outsiders play no role in this process. The main 
interest of insiders is to keep their wage level. The employment of outsiders has no 
priority. As long as the economic system is not submitted to radical changes in social 
institutions or a big shock (such as an oil crisis or a major war), insiders bargain so 
as to get the highest wage level possible without losing their employed position. As a 
consequence, nothing changes and outsiders remain unemployed. 
 
The level at which wage bargaining takes place determines the strength of the 
insider-outsider dichotomy and, therefore, the extent to which school-leavers are 
integrated into the labour market. At one extreme, firms and employees can 
negotiate on wages at the level of the individual enterprise. In that case, the wage 
bargaining structure is labelled as decentralised. At the other extreme, wage 
bargaining is called centralised when employees and employers are organised into 
nationwide unions, where the rate of unionisation of both employers and employees 
is high and where wages are negotiated at the central level. Lastly, wage bargaining 
is called intermediately centralised when wage negotiations occur at industry level. 
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Calmfors and Driffill (1988) have argued that the economic performance of countries 
is best at both extremes of centralisation degrees. Countries characterised by 
intermediately centralised economies, however, have to deal with larger 
unemployment rates. This phenomenon is known as the hump-shaped relationship 
between the degree of centralisation and unemployment. 
 
The arguments for this relationship are sought in imperfectly competitive labour 
markets, where both the level of employment and the real wage are included in the 
unions’ utility function. Both in decentralised and centralised wage bargaining 
systems, the agents involved in the bargaining process face a very adverse trade-off 
between the real wage and employment, but for different reasons. The trade-off is 
adverse for decentralised unions, because if they set a high money wage this will be 
passed on in the price of the firm. The price increase will lead to a substantial loss of 
demand for the firm’s products and consequently will lead to lower employment at the 
firm. Together, these factors will induce unions that operate in decentralised wage 
bargaining systems to set moderate wage demands. In a centralised wage 
bargaining structure, on the other hand, high money (nominal) wages set by unions 
will not lead to equally high real wage increases, because of the high degree of 
unionisation. This high degree of unionisation will lead to high money wages 
throughout the whole economy and consequently to high price changes throughout 
the whole economy, too. Eventually, nominal wages will indeed increase, but real 
wages will not. The only effect that setting high money wages will have is a 
deterioration of the competitive position. Again, there is no incentive for unions to set 
high money wages. 
 
The contrary applies to unions operating in intermediately centralised wage 
bargaining systems. High money wages set by unions will lead to only a limited loss 
of demand for the products of the firm if this firm passes on the wage increases to the 
product prices, because all firms within the sector have to increase their prices. The 
other argument which would induce unions to set moderate wage demands - i.e. high 
nominal wage demands will not lead to high real wage increases, because of the 
general price increases - does not apply or only partially applies to the intermediate 
case, too. Only prices within the same sector will rise, but not those in other sectors, 
which will make real wage increases nearly as high as nominal wage increases. 
Therefore, in intermediately centralised wage bargaining systems, there is indeed an 
incentive to set high wage demands. 
 
In previous empirical results, however, there is little systematic evidence of a hump-
shaped relationship between the degree of centralisation of the wage bargaining 
process and the level of unemployment (OECD, 1997: Chapter 3). Instead, some 
authors (for example Soskice, 1990; Layard, Nickell and Jackman, 1991) challenged 
Calmfors and Drifill’s conclusions and proposed a negative linear relationship. Their 
argument is that the favourable performance effects of increasing centralisation that 
arise from taking the macroeconomic results of any agreement on wages into 
consideration are stronger than the adverse effects from imperfect product market 
competition. In addition, Soskice (1990) concentrates on co-ordination instead of 
centralisation. He argues that it is not the locus of the formal wage bargaining that is 
 7 
relevant, but the degree of consensus between the agents in the collective 
bargaining process. In this way, co-ordination and centralisation may be seen as two 
different paths to achieve the same goal. Therefore, our first hypothesis is: 
 
Hypothesis 1: 
The more centralised and co-ordinated the wage bargaining structure is in a country, 
the more likely it is that within this country young people are integrated into the labour 
market. 
 
Irrespective of the degree of centralisation/co-ordination of the wage bargaining 
structure, it is assumed that the degree to which workers’ wages are determined by 
collective bargaining or the degree to which workers are unionised in a country is 
important with regard to unemployment. In principle, union power is insider power. 
Therefore, we expect that the power of unions is likely to play an important role in the 
integration process of youngsters into the labour market: 
 
Hypothesis 2: 
The more power unions have in a country, the less likely it is that within this country 
young people are integrated into the labour market. 
 
Apart from wage bargaining, insiders negotiate about employment protection. 
Employment protection refers to regulations concerning both hiring and firing and is 
intended to reduce economic uncertainty of workers by enhancing job security 
(OECD, 1999: Chapter 2). In general, insiders try to increase their job security by 
fixing more firmly a number of employment conditions (such as period of notice, 
severance pay, seniority) in the law and/or collective labour agreements. Especially, 
seniority is a major criterion. Usually, this principle prohibits settled employees to be 
fired and youngsters, who are the last employees that entered the firm, will be the 
first to be fired if the firm needs to do so. This is called the principle of ‘last in first out’ 
(LIFO) (Oswald, 1987). For outsiders, employment protection tends to trap them in 
long-term unemployment or in an unstable position shifting between unemployment 
and temporary jobs. This is especially true for school-leavers. From this point of view, 
employment protection legislation undermines the chances of getting a stable labour 
market position for young people. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: 
The stricter the employment protection legislation is in a country, the less likely it is 
that within this country young people are integrated into the labour market. 
 
2.1.2 Public spending on active labour market policies for youngsters 
Being an unemployed outsider can have permanent effects, since unemployment 
duration is negatively correlated with reemployment probabilities (Devine and Kiefer, 
1991; Sprengers, 1992; Wolbers, 2000). There are several explanations for this 
relationship. First of all, there is the hypothesis that the decay of human capital 
during unemployment spells decreases the reemployment probabilities of long-term 
unemployed (Bean, 1994). The longer individuals stay out of employment, the more 
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their skills deteriorate, and the higher the costs will be for future employers to refresh 
these skills. A second explanation is formulated in the search motivation hypothesis 
(Layard and Nickell, 1986). This hypothesis states that the duration of unemployment 
spells affects the motivation and morale of the unemployed negatively. Getting 
rejected several times at job applications decreases the motivation to continue to 
search for jobs and breaks down self-confidence, which is needed to be successful at 
job applications. Others (for example Vishwanath, 1989) point out that the negative 
relationship between unemployment duration and reemployment probabilities origins 
from firm behaviour. That is, employers use the employment records of applicants as 
a screening device. Because employers lack exact information about applicants or it 
is too costly to gather this information, employers introduce indicators to select 
between the available employees. One of these indicators is unemployment duration. 
 
Hence, to tackle the problem of (long-term) unemployment, unemployed outsiders 
need help to regain employment. Since the early nineties, this help has come from 
government intervention by means of active labour market policies. Governments 
throughout Europe introduced policies to help the long-term unemployed get back 
into the labour market, varying from teaching the unemployed how to write 
application letters to actually subsidising employment places for them. This to restore 
their self-confidence, or to refresh their human capital. The fact that youth 
unemployment rates are structurally higher than general unemployment rates and the 
lack of work experience of youngsters, have induced many governments to aim 
active labour market policies especially at them (Calmfors, 1994). The effects of 
active labour market policies on the integration process of youngsters into the labour 
market can not be said to be obvious beforehand, since important active policies 
possibly are a sign that there is an integration problem. But, as soon as we take the 
general labour market situation of a country into account, it is expected that the help 
youngsters get from the government will improve their job prospects either directly 
when they get a subsidised job or indirectly when they are supported by the 
government at application training sessions. So: 
 
Hypothesis 4: 
The more active labour market policies for youngsters are in a country, the more 
likely it is that within this country young people are integrated into the labour market.  
 
2.2 National institutional factors related to the education and training system 
2.2.1 Vocational specificity 
Apart from national differences related to labour market regulations, cross-country 
variation with regard to institutional arrangements in education and training systems 
affect the integration process of young people into the labour market. First of all, 
countries differ in the extent to which there is an institutional link between the 
education and training system on the one hand and the employment system on the 
other (Maurice, Sellier and Silvestre, 1982; Hannan, Raffe and Smyth, 1997; Müller 
and Shavit, 1998). Basically, this debate refers to the extent to which education 
systems differentiate between academic and vocational education. Some countries 
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offer mainly general education. In such countries, education is weakly related to the 
workplace and vocational training is primarily obtained on the job. In other countries, 
occupation-specific skills are taught in the education and training system. Here, the 
link between the education/training system and the employment system is strong. 
The way in which this close link between the education/training system and the 
employment system is institutionalised, may differ. In some cases, the teaching of 
vocational skills is shared between vocational schools and the workplace, such as in 
the apprenticeship systems in Germany and surrounding countries (‘dual system’). In 
other cases, however, the provision of vocational skills is primarily school-based. 
 
In vocational programmes that are mainly occupation-specific - irrespective of how 
these programmes are institutionalised in the education system -, school-leavers 
have few transferable skills, which prepares them for a few, particular jobs. For 
employers these school-leavers are very attractive to hire, since the curricula of the 
vocational programmes already supply them the skills required for the job, which 
reduces the training costs for employers. Consequently, it is expected that in 
countries that provide a differentiated system of vocational education, the association 
between education and labour market outcomes is more tightened, and, 
subsequently, young people are more easily integrated into the labour market than in 
countries that offer primarily general education. This leads to the following 
hypothesis:   
 
Hypothesis 5: 
The more vocational specific the education system is within a country, the more likely 
it is that within this country young people are integrated into the labour market. 
 
2.2.2 Standardisation and stratification 
The school-to-work transition in countries differs also according to the 
standardisation of educational provisions and the stratification of educational 
opportunities of the education system (Allmendinger, 1989; Müller and Shavit, 1998). 
Standardisation concerns the degree to which the quality of education meets the 
same nationwide standards - for example with regard to teacher training, school 
budgets, curricula and uniformity of examination/certification terms. Stratification has 
to do with the extent and form of tracking at the secondary educational level (see 
Müller and Shavit, 1998: 50). In highly stratified education systems, pupils are divided 
into separate tracks very early in their educational careers. Furthermore, in these 
systems it is difficult to switch between tracks, since the tracks are too diverse. On 
the other hand, in countries characterised by a low degree of stratification, the 
diversity between different tracks is limited, which results in high mobility between 
tracks.  
 
It is assumed that the relationship between the educational qualifications and labour 
market outcomes of individuals is more tightened in countries that have a highly 
standardised and stratified education system. The reason for it is that high 
standardisation and stratification make screening by employers easier. High 
standardisation makes the qualities of school-leavers simple to interprete and 
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compare. High stratification leads to school-leavers having specific skills. Once 
again, this makes screening by employers easier, because in that situation 
employers know exactly what kind of school-leaver they need to accept for the 
specific vacancy they have. In the absence of high standardisation and high 
stratification, it will be more difficult for employers to screen the best qualified 
individual for their vacancies. Therefore, it is expected that a high degree of 
standardisation and stratification of the education system facilitates the integration 
process of young people into the labour market. Since in all European countries the 
education/training systems are highly standardised (Hannan et al., 1999; Müller and 
Shavit, 1998), we only formulate a hypothesis with respect to the stratification of the 
education system: 
 
Hypothesis 6: 
The more stratified the education system is within a country, the more likely it is that 
within this country young people are integrated into the labour market 
 
2.2.3 Selectivity 
Lastly, the selectivity of the education system affects transition processes from 
school to work. In this study, selectivity refers to (explicit state policies to) expand or 
limit the education system. In general, the educational participation has grown 
everywhere in Europe in recent decades, but from different starting points, in different 
ways, and with different results (Müller and Wolbers, 1999). The educational growth 
has been driven by various considerations. First of all, the increase in educational 
participation has been ideologically desired in order to reduce the unequal 
distribution of educational attainment between social groups (Shavit and Blossfeld, 
1993). Secondly, due to rapid technological changes, more and more occupations on 
the labour market require higher skill levels (Denison, 1962). Thirdly, the rapid 
educational expansion has been an answer to recent social problems, such as youth 
unemployment, that keep young people out of the labour force - and in the education 
system - as long as possible (Hannan and Werquin, 1999).  
  
In order to enhance educational expansion, institutional reforms of the education 
system have been implemented almost everywhere. It is assumed that the existing 
national traditions in the set-up of educational institutions and in the provision of 
education has affected the course of educational reforms and, subsequently, the 
degree of educational expansion (Müller and Wolbers, 1999: 20). In particular, the 
(non)existence of an established tradition of vocational education has determined the 
course of reforms. Especially in countries that have no tradition of vocational 
orientation in secondary education, the need and pressure for an extensive system of 
tertiary education are large, and for these countries one should therefore assume a 
strong growth in educational participation on the tertiary level. 
 
Excessive educational expansion has detrimental consequences for labour market 
outcomes (Boudon, 1974). At the level of individuals, it forces young people to obtain 
ever more and higher levels of education, just in order to stay in a favourable position 
in the job queue (Thurow, 1975). At the societal level, high enrolment rates in tertiary 
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education may lead to credential inflation. That is, if there are more highly educated 
school-leavers than the labour market can absorb, the labour market value of 
credentials declines (Brauns, Müller and Steinmann, 1997; Gangl and Brauns, 1999; 
Wolbers, De Graaf and Ultee, 2001). In that situation, a number of highly educated 
individuals has to accept jobs for which the required level of education is lower than 
the actual attained level (‘overeducation’). In addition, the oversupply of highly 
educated school-leavers may lead to unemployment or employment exclusion 
among them, especially among the least qualified. Therefore, it is expected that a 
little selective education system, characterised by a strong educational participation 
in particular on the tertiary level, hinders the integration of youngsters into the labour 
market. Or formulated the other way around: 
 
Hypothesis 7: 
The more selective the education system is in a country, the more  likely it is that 
within this country young people are integrated into the labour market. 
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3 Research design 
3.1 Data and definitions 
For the purpose of this study, we use the European Community Labour Force Survey 
(ECLFS) data set as a means to construct the key indicators. This cross-sectional 
data set is a combination of the original Labour Force Surveys (LFS) as held by the 
individual Member States. Together they form the ECLFS data set, which is the best 
available data set for the moment to address the issue of the transition from 
education to work in Europe. The data set is attractive for the large sample size, the 
standardised survey design and the wide range of characteristics related to current 
labour market participation and employment. The ECLFS is an annual data set and in 
this study we make use of data collected during spring time in the period 1992-1997 
(due to their recent membership of the European Union, we only have information for 
Austria, Finland and Sweden about the last three years). 
 
To describe the transition from education to work, we have to define school-leavers. 
Since the ECLFS data set is a cross-sectional data set describing current labour 
market participation, individual trajectories into the labour market are not captured by 
the data. In this study, therefore, we adopt an indirect approach to identify school-
leavers. First, we know the current employment status of all respondents. Besides 
that, in the available data set a retrospective question is included asking the 
respondent to give his/her employment status one year before. By combining the 
information originating from these two questions, we distil school-leavers out of the 
total labour force.  
 
A drawback of this approach is that is does not per se follow that the respondents in 
question have permanently left initial education. It might well be that youngsters 
leave the education system temporally and return later. Consequently, some 
individuals that are considered here as school-leavers are not school-leavers in the 
strict sense. More important, there is a rather large proportion of youngsters 
combining schooling and paid employment (Welters and Wolbers, 1999). Firstly, in 
the ECLFS data set, apprentices are not counted as being in education, but are 
counted as employed. This implies that countries such as Austria, Germany and 
Denmark, where the apprenticeship system is quantitatively spoken well-established, 
tend to show higher employment probabilities due to the definition of school-leavers 
used here. Secondly, the ECLFS data set is based on regular ILO conventions and 
definitions about the labour force (ILO, 1990). This implies that working students are 
counted as participating in the labour force. Since there are cross-country differences 
with regard to working students (especially in the Scandinavian countries, the 
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, a relatively large proportion of students have a 
job) this might bias the employment probabilities between countries. 
 
We distinguish between two groups of school-leavers: recent and less recent school-
leavers. This distinction is made, because the two groups are at different stages of 
the transition process, which surely has consequences for the extent to which the 
groups are integrated into the labour market. A recent school-leaver is defined as 
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follows: he or she who was a pupil or a student in initial education or training one 
year before the survey and who at the time of the survey no longer is a pupil or 
student. To define the group of less recent school-leavers, we use the typical 
graduation age of students, which is the average age of the group of recent school-
leavers during the survey minus one year (because he/she finished school one year 
earlier). We compute this average graduation age for each educational level and for 
each country. Taking this graduation age into account, we define a less recent 
school-leaver as follows: he or she who, given his or her educational level and 
country, is aged between one and five years older than the graduation age of a 
school-leaver having the same education level and living in the same country. This 
definition implies that we compare throughout the Member States individuals who 
have (potentially) equal labour market experience, which is of crucial importance if 
we want to compare differences in the integration process of youngsters into the 
labour market between the countries. 
 
The differentiation of the various kinds of qualification levels and the identification of 
similar levels across countries constitute a difficult task, because of the different 
structures of the education systems. In particular, it is problematic to establish 
equivalencies among different tertiary level certificates in different countries. Some 
countries classify certain programmes as secondary level education, whereas others 
regard them as tertiary level education. For the current analysis therefore, we use a 
broad rather than a narrow definition of educational levels. We distinguish three 
educational levels, namely the lower, middle and upper part of the educational range, 
based on the seven-level International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) 
(UNESCO, 1975). The first group consists of persons with a basic education (often 
compulsory education) up to a lower secondary education at most (ISCED 0-2). The 
second group consists of youngsters having attained maximally upper secondary 
education (ISCED 3). The third group is made up of individuals with all kinds of 
tertiary education (non-university tertiary education as well as university-based 
tertiary education) (ISCED 5-7). 
 
Table 3.1 shows the average graduation ages of school-leavers for each level of 
education and each country. The average graduation age of school-leavers who 
finished ISCED0-2 level at most within the European Union is 15. The differences 
between the Member States are rather small. In some countries, especially in 
Belgium and Sweden, this graduation age is higher. The lowest graduation age for 
the attainment of lower qualifications can be found in Ireland and the United 
Kingdom. The average graduation age of youngsters who successfully finish an 
intermediate educational level (ISCED3) is 19. The graduation age in Germany, 
Finland and Sweden is two years above the European average. The lowest 
graduation age for youngsters with intermediate education levels can be found in the 
British Islands. There, the average graduation age is 18 years old. The differences 
between countries’ graduation ages are largest for tertiary education (ISCED5-7). 
The average graduation age at which youngsters obtain their degree in tertiary 
education is 23. In Germany, Denmark and Finland, this graduation age is 
substantially higher with 26 years of age. Also in Austria and Italy, tertiary education 
is attained at a relatively late age (25 years). In Belgium, Ireland and the United 
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Kingdom, on the other hand, the attainment of tertiary education takes place at a 
rather young age. In these countries, youngsters on average obtain their degree in 
tertiary education when they are aged 21 or 22. 
 
Table 3.1 
Average graduation ages, by educational level and country 
 
 
Country ISCED0-2 ISCED3 ISCED5-7 
 years years years 
 
 
European Union (EU) 15 19 23 
 
Austria (AT) 16 20 25 
Belgium (BE) 18 20 22 
Germany (DE) 17 21 26 
Denmark (DK) 16 20 26 
Spain (ES) 16 19 23 
Finland (FI) 16 21 26 
France (FR) 17 20 23 
Greece (GR) 16 19 23 
Ireland (IE) 15 18 21 
Italy (IT) 16 20 25 
Luxembourg (LU) 18 20 23 
Netherlands (NL) 16 20 24 
Portugal (PT) 17 20 23 
Sweden (SE) 18 21 24 
United Kingdom (UK) 15 18 22 
 
Source: pooled ECLFS-data 1992-1997 
 
Table 3.2 displays the educational distribution of school-leavers within the European 
Union. This table shows that throughout the European Union nearly 50 percent of all 
school-leavers have attained a diploma at the intermediate level (ISCED3). The two 
other educational levels have equal shares of about one quarter each. However, the 
differences in educational attainment between the countries are substantial. The 
proportion of school-leavers that has attained only lower qualifications (ISCED0-2) is 
relatively small in countries such as Austria, Belgium, Germany, France and Sweden. 
In these countries, less than 20 percent of all school-leavers have attained no more 
than lower qualifications. In the South European countries, but also in Luxembourg 
and the United Kingdom, on the other hand, a high proportion of low educated 
school-leavers can be found. Portugal has the top position, with more than two thirds 
of all school-leavers having only basic education. 
 
Countries that have the highest shares of school-leavers with qualifications at the 
intermediate level (ISCED3) are Austria, Germany and Sweden. These are three 
countries that have small proportions of low educated school-leavers. Moreover, 
these countries have an elaborate system of vocational education at the intermediate 
level, which prepares youngsters very well for their entrance into the labour market. 
Low shares of intermediate educated school-leavers can be found in Spain, Portugal 
and the United Kingdom. Not surprisingly, these countries have high shares of low 
educated youngsters. 
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With regard to the attainment of tertiary education (ISCED5-7), there are large 
differences between countries as well. The lowest proportions of high educated 
school-leavers are found in Austria, Italy and Portugal, where no more than 10 
percent of all youngsters have left school with a degree at the tertiary level. On the 
other hand, countries such as Spain, Belgium, Ireland and France experienced an 
enormous expansion of higher education. Around one third of all school-leavers in 
these countries enters the labour market with a degree in tertiary education. 
 
Table 3.2 
Educational attainment of school-leavers, by country 
 
 
Country ISCED0-2 ISCED3 ISCED5-7 
 % % % 
 
 
European Union 28 48 24 
 
Austria 12 77 11 
Belgium 19 47 34 
Germany 9 65 26 
Denmark 18 57 25 
Spain 42 24 34 
Finland 25 52 23 
France 21 49 30 
Greece 25 52 23 
Ireland 29 42 29 
Italy 39 51 10 
Luxembourg 43 33 24 
Netherlands 17 58 25 
Portugal 68 20 12 
Sweden 17 60 23 
United Kingdom 43 33 24 
 
Source: pooled ECLFS-data 1992-1997 
 
3.2 Key indicators 
On the basis of the ECLFS data set, we use four key indicators to describe the (lack 
of) integration of young people into the labour market:  
- being out of the labour force; 
- being unemployed; 
- having a temporary job; 
- having a part-time job. 
 
Although these four indicators do not give a full insight into the integration process of 
school-leavers into the labour market, they give at least a good reflection. This is due 
to the rather limited availability of key indicators with regard to the transition from 
school to work in the ECLFS data set. Firstly, information on wages is lacking. 
Secondly, job match or skill use characteristics are missing. For instance, it cannot 
be determined whether the actual level of education held by school-leavers fits with 
the theoretical level of education requested by the job (‘overeducation’). Thirdly, 
information on labour mobility is not available. Since school-leavers often start in jobs 
that do not match their education, job mobility is considerable among school-leavers. 
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As mentioned above, the ECLFS data set follows ILO definitions. According to this 
definition, the labour force consists of any individuals who did paid work (even for as 
little as one hour) at the time of the survey, or who were not working but had a job 
from which the person was absent at the time of the survey. In addition, any 
individual who was out of employment, who was a conscript on compulsory military 
or community service, or who had other reasons for being out of employment, but 
who was looking for work and who could start working within two weeks, is included 
in the labour force. The unemployed labour force is defined as those individuals who 
are out of employment, but who are looking for employment and could start working 
within two weeks if they found a job. Unemployment rates are computed as the 
proportion of unemployed in the total labour force. 
 
The permanency of a job is measured by making the distinction between permanent 
and temporary jobs. A temporary job refers to a job that is not permanent or to a job 
with a work contract of limited duration. The full-time/part-time distinction is based on 
the subjective evaluation of the respondent and not on the number of hours actually 
worked. 
 
3.3 Measuring youth labour market performance 
If one wants to assess whether the integration of young people into the labour market 
differs between countries, two problems arise. Firstly, most research on cross-
country differences in the performance of the labour market uses aggregate ‘gross’ 
statistics. However, countries constitute merely a ‘contextual’ variable when 
explaining the integration process of young people. The aim is to assess the overall 
country effect against other individual level variables, such as the level of education. 
Looking at aggregate ‘gross’ indicators may well overestimate the ‘true’ between-
country variation, because part of these gross differences reflect variation between 
individual characteristics within countries. 
 
Secondly, the interest is in the more stable between-country variation. However, part 
of the differences between countries vary from year to year. These reflect variation 
between countries in the business cycle or other ‘temporary’ causes of cross-country 
differences. In an analysis of differences between countries, one would like to focus 
on the more ‘stable’ differences between the countries. 
 
The method used for estimating differences in youth labour market performance 
between countries can improve significantly from recent developments in statistical 
theories, most noticeable the so-called multilevel statistical models (Bryk and 
Raudenbush, 1992; Goldstein, 1995; Longford, 1993). In this case of measuring 
cross-country differences in the labour market performance of young people, there is 
a need for adequate statistical control for variation within countries between years 
and individuals. There is consensus that the use of aggregate data to control for 
these input characteristics will lead to misspecification of the true differences. Using 
aggregate cross-country data will therefore lead to performance scores of which the 
meaning and validity are highly questionable. Instead, data at an individual level is 
necessary. The basic idea in the multilevel approach is that individual labour market 
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outcomes are predicted on the basis of their background characteristics (such as the 
level of education attained), as well as contextual variables (to explain differences 
between years and countries). 
 
The multilevel model also fulfils the requirement with respect to the data. The time 
span of the data that are used for this study is relatively short: the available ECLFS 
data set covers only the period 1992-1997. Therefore, it is not possible to estimate 
separate models for each country. Due to the structure of the multilevel model, 
however, it is possible to pool the data. Since in that case more data are available, 
the statistical reliability of the estimations will improve. 
 
In the first stage, we start with a description of between country differences in the 
integration process of young people into the labour market (Chapter 4). In the second 
stage, we try to explain these gross differences found between the various countries 
by taking into account the effects of industrial relations, institutional contexts with 
regard to the education/training system, and general labour market conditions 
(Chapter 5). This gives us insight in the true performance of youth labour markets. 
For this multilevel analysis, the individual pooled data from the ECLFS data set are 
matched with aggregate timeseries referring to differences in industrial relations, 
institutional contexts with regard to the education/training system and general labour 
market conditions between the various Member States. These timeseries are based 
on published national statistics. 
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4 Country differences in the labour market 
integration of young people 
The aim of this chapter is to describe cross-country differences in the integration 
process of young people into the labour market using the four key indicators as 
defined in the previous chapter. In fact, the figures that are shown here represent 
differences in the gross performance of youth labour markets. In the description, we 
break the results down by type of school-leaver, level of education and gender. 
These three individual characteristics are human capital factors that will be controlled 
for in the subsequent analysis. All three variables will have considerable effects on 
the integration process of young people into the labour market. In general, we expect 
that less recent, higher educated and male school-leavers are more integrated into 
the labour market than recent, lower educated and female school-leavers. 
 
4.1 Being out of the labour force 
We start with presenting results concerning the labour force participation of school-
leavers. Figure 4.1 shows the proportion of young people that are not in the labour 
force after they left school. The rate of inactivity is highest in Finland, shortly followed 
by Ireland and the United Kingdom. In these countries, between 20 and 25 percent of 
all school-leavers do not participate in the labour force. In the Netherlands, the 
proportion of inactive school-leavers is lowest (only eight percent). Also in Austria, 
Luxembourg, Belgium, Germany and Denmark, the percentage of school-leavers 
being out of the labour market is relatively low. All other countries show proportions 
around the European Union average of 15 percent of inactivity among school-
leavers. 
 
Figure 4.1 
Share of school-leavers being out of the labour force, by country 
Source: pooled ECLFS-data 1992-1997 
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As expected, recent school-leavers have a higher probability of being out of the 
labour force than less recent school-leavers (see Table 4.1). On average, the share 
of recent school-leavers being out of the labour market is 30 percent, whereas 11 
percent of all less recent school-leavers is inactive. The corresponding odds ratio is 
3.47 ((30/70)/(11/89)), which means that the odds of being inactive versus active for 
recent school-leavers is almost three-and-a-half times higher than the odds of being 
inactive versus active for less recent school-leavers. This clearly indicates that the 
two groups of school-leavers find themselves at different stages of the integration 
process. The differences are largest in Ireland and the United Kingdom. This large 
difference is totally explained by the difficulties that recent school-leavers have in 
both countries to find a position in the labour force (employed or unemployed). For 
this type of school-leavers, the share of inactive individuals is around half, which is 
considerably higher than the average of 30 percent within the European Union as a 
whole. For less recent school-leavers in Ireland and the United Kingdom, on the 
other hand, the probability of being out of the labour force is below average. In 
Germany, the variation in inactivity between the two types of school-leavers is 
smallest. It seems that this has something to do with the existence of the dual system 
in this country, since in other countries with an apprenticeship system, such as the 
Netherlands, Luxembourg and Denmark, differences in the probability of being out of 
the labour force between recent and less recent school-leavers are relatively small as 
well. For Austria, however, this explanation does not seem to work. Although in this 
country there is an extensive system of apprenticeships, the variation with regard to 
inactivity is larger than in the other countries with an apprenticeship system. 
 
Table 4.1 
Differences in shares of being out of the labour force, by type of school-leaver and country 
 
 
Country recent less recent 
 school-leavers school-leavers 
 % % odds ratio 
 
 
European Union 30 11 3.47 
 
Austria 22 7 3.75 
Belgium 17 9 2.07 
Germany 13 10 1.34 
Denmark 16 7 2.53 
Spain 24 13 2.11 
Finland 37 14 3.61 
France 30 13 2.87 
Greece 22 15 1.60 
Ireland 53 7 14.98 
Italy 25 13 2.23 
Luxembourg 14 8 1.87 
Netherlands 13 7 1.99 
Portugal 19 11 1.90 
Sweden 27 11 2.99 
United Kingdom 49 8 11.05 
 
Source: pooled ECLFS-data 1992-1997 
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Table 4.2 shows that, without any exception, lower educated school-leavers are more 
likely to be out of the labour force than higher educated. In the European Union as a 
whole, 24 percent of the lower qualified (ISCED0-2) is inactive, 12 percent of the 
intermediate educated (ISCED3), and eight percent of the school-leavers with a degree 
in higher education (ISCED5-7). Again, in the United Kingdom and Ireland the effect is 
strongest. In these two countries, the odds ratio for the contrast between ISCED0-2 and 
ISCED5-7 is 12.67 and 10.87 respectively. Germany and the Netherlands, on the other 
hand, show the smallest variation between levels of education. 
 
Table 4.2 
Differences in shares of being out of the labour force, by educational level and country 
 
 
Country ISCED0-2 ISCED3 ISCED5-7 
 % % % odds ratioa 
 
 
European Union 24 12 8 3.63 
 
Austria 13 8 6 2.34 
Belgium 21 9 5 5.05 
Germany 11 11 6 1.94 
Denmark 13 9 5 2.84 
Spain 21 15 8 3.06 
Finland 38 22 10 5.52 
France 24 15 12 2.32 
Greece 25 15 8 3.83 
Ireland 45 19 7 10.87 
Italy 22 11 8 3.24 
Luxembourg 13 5 5 2.84 
Netherlands 10 8 6 1.74 
Portugal 15 10 3 5.71 
Sweden 19 14 8 2.70 
United Kingdom 40 10 5 12.67 
 
Source: pooled ECLFS-data 1992-1997 
a: ISCED0-2 versus ISCED5-7 
 
Differences in inactivity rates between men and women are presented in Table 4.3. 
Overall, there is a very weak association between gender and the likelihood of being 
out of the labour force. Within the European Union, 15 percent of all female school-
leavers is not participating in the labour force, whereas the corresponding percentage 
among male school-leavers is 14 percent. However, there is some variation in 
gender differences between countries. Luxembourg and Greece show the largest 
gender difference with regard to inactivity (odds ratio’s are 4.24 and 2.69, 
respectively). In all other countries, the odds ratio’s are less than 1.5. Finally, in 
Austria, Spain, Finland, France and Portugal, male school-leavers are slightly more 
often out of the labour force than their female counterparts. The opposite findings for 
these countries are rather restricted as well. 
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Table 4.3 
Differences in shares of being out of the labour force, by gender and country 
 
 
Country women men 
 % % odds ratio 
 
 
European Union 15 14 1.08 
 
Austria 8 9 0.88 
Belgium 11 8 1.42 
Germany 11 9 1.25 
Denmark 11 9 1.25 
Spain 13 17 0.73 
Finland 24 25 0.95 
France 15 18 0.80 
Greece 21 9 2.69 
Ireland 25 21 1.25 
Italy 16 14 1.17 
Luxembourg 15 4 4.24 
Netherlands 9 7 1.31 
Portugal 12 13 0.91 
Sweden 14 12 1.19 
United Kingdom 25 19 1.42 
 
Source: pooled ECLFS-data 1992-1997 
 
4.2 Being unemployed 
The most common key indicator with regard to the integration of young people into 
the labour market is the level of unemployment among school-leavers. As can be 
seen from Figure 4.2, the unemployment rates differ a great deal within the European 
Union. In Italy and Spain, around 40 percent of all school-leavers is unemployed. 
Also in Greece and Finland, a large proportion of young people entering the labour 
market is unemployed (in both countries 31 percent). In Luxembourg, Austria, 
Germany and Denmark, on the other hand, less than 10 percent of all school-leavers 
is without a job. All other countries take more or less a position in the middle, and the 
average unemployment rate within the European Union is 19 percent. 
 
If a distinction is made between recent and less recent school-leavers (as is done in 
Table 4.4), we find that recent school-leavers are unemployed more frequently than 
less recent school-leavers. Of all youngsters within the European Union who left 
school less than one year ago, 30 percent is unemployed, whereas 17 percent of all 
less recent school-leavers has no job. The corresponding odds ratio is 2.09 
((30/70)/(17/83)). Differences in the probability of being unemployed between recent 
and less recent school-leavers are most striking in the Netherlands, Finland and 
Portugal, where the odds of being unemployed versus employed for recent school-
leavers is at least four times higher than the corresponding odds for less recent 
school-leavers. In other countries, such as France, Denmark and Ireland, differences 
in the unemployment rates between recent and less recent school-leavers are only 
moderate. In Germany, there is no difference at all. The unemployment rate for both 
recent and less recent school-leavers is seven percent in this country. 
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Figure 4.2  
Share of school-leavers being unemployed, by country 
Source: pooled ECLFS-data 1992-1997 
 
Table 4.4 
Differences in shares of being unemployed, by type of school-leaver and country 
 
 
Country recent less recent 
 school-leavers school-leavers 
 % % odds ratio 
 
 
European Union 30 17 2.09 
 
Austria 13 5 2.84 
Belgium 30 14 2.63 
Germany 7 7 1.00 
Denmark 12 8 1.57 
Spain 58 36 2.46 
Finland 52 20 4.33 
France 30 18 1.95 
Greece 57 28 3.41 
Ireland 22 17 1.38 
Italy 67 35 3.77 
Luxembourg 11 5 2.35 
Netherlands 30 8 4.93 
Portugal 35 11 4.36 
Sweden 34 15 2.92 
United Kingdom 20 11 2.02 
 
Source: pooled ECLFS-data 1992-1997 
 
In Table 4.5, the unemployment rates are broken down by educational level. Not 
surprisingly, there is a negative association between unemployment risk and level of 
education. The higher the level of education a school-leaver has attained, the smaller 
the likelihood that he/she is unemployed. Within the whole European Union, 26 
percent of all lower educated school-leavers are unemployed. This figure goes down 
to 18 percent for those with a certificate at the intermediate level and to 14 for those 
with a degree in higher education. The negative association between unemployment 
risk and educational level is found in all countries, although there is a great deal of 
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cross-country variation. The association is strongest in Finland, Ireland, Sweden and 
Belgium. In these countries, the protective effect of education against unemployment 
is clearest. In Denmark, Germany, Italy, Spain and Portugal, on the other hand, 
unemployment rates differ only to a small extent between levels of education. Note 
that this does not imply that these five countries are similar with respect to their 
unemployment levels. Although the relative difference in unemployment risk between 
lower and higher educated are the same in these countries, the absolute levels of 
unemployment are much higher in the South European countries than in Germany 
and Denmark. 
 
Table 4.5 
Differences in shares of being unemployed, by educational level and country 
 
 
Country ISCED0-2 ISCED3 ISCED5-7 
 % % % odds ratioa 
 
 
European Union 26 18 14 2.16 
 
Austria 9 5 5 1.88 
Belgium 30 17 8 4.93 
Germany 8 8 5 1.65 
Denmark 9 10 7 1.31 
Spain 44 42 33 1.60 
Finland 56 28 13 8.52 
France 33 20 12 3.61 
Greece 25 36 26 0.95 
Ireland 35 16 9 5.44 
Italy 42 40 35 1.34 
Luxembourg 9 4 3 3.20 
Netherlands 18 9 8 2.52 
Portugal 14 18 10 1.47 
Sweden 24 19 6 4.95 
United Kingdom 19 13 7 3.12 
 
Source: pooled ECLFS-data 1992-1997 
a: ISCED0-2 versus ISCED5-7 
 
Unemployment rates differ between men and women as well (see Table 4.6). In most 
countries, female school-leavers are more often unemployed than their male 
counterparts. However, the differences are not very large. For the European Union 
as a whole, 21 percent of all female school-leavers are unemployed, whereas this 
share is 18 percent for men. The largest difference is found in Greece. In this 
country, an odds ratio of 2.05 is found. This implies that the odds of being 
unemployed for women is more than two times larger than the corresponding odds 
for men. In Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom, men are more 
often unemployed at labour market entry than women. 
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Table 4.6 
Differences in shares of being unemployed, by gender and country 
 
 
Country women  men 
 % % odds ratio 
 
 
European Union 21 18 1.21 
 
Austria 6 6 1.00 
Belgium 17 15 1.16 
Germany 7 7 1.00 
Denmark 10 8 1.28 
Spain 44 35 1.46 
Finland 31 31 1.00 
France 22 18 1.28 
Greece 38 23 2.05 
Ireland 16 19 0.81 
Italy 45 36 1.45 
Luxembourg 6 5 1.21 
Netherlands 10 11 0.90 
Portugal 16 13 1.27 
Sweden 15 17 0.86 
United Kingdom 11 16 0.65 
 
Source: pooled ECLFS-data 1992-1997 
 
4.3 Having a temporary job 
Another important aspect of the integration process is job security. Having a 
temporary job increases the probability to fall back into unemployment again after 
expiration of the temporary contract, and reduces therefore the integration into the 
labour market. In Figure 4.3, the proportions of school-leavers with a temporary job 
across the countries of the European Union are displayed. Spain certainly has the 
top-rank position with regard to the share of school-leavers who are in temporary 
jobs. In this country, almost three quarters of all working young people who left 
school less than five years ago, do not have a permanent contract. In Finland, nearly 
half of the working school-leavers are in a temporary labour market position. These 
findings imply that in both countries the integration process of young people is not 
only hindered by a large number of individuals who cannot find a job (as shown in the 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2), but even the greater part of the youngsters who are employed, 
have a precarious labour market position in the sense that their contract is often 
temporary. Sweden, France and Portugal have a relatively large proportion of school-
leavers with a temporary contract as well. All other countries show percentages that 
are below the European Union average. Only in Luxembourg (six percent) and 
Austria (nine percent), less than one tenth of the employed school-leavers have a 
temporary work contract. 
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Figure 4.3 
Share of school-leavers having a temporary job, by country 
Source: pooled ECLFS-data 1992-1997 
 
If we break down the share of youngsters holding a temporary job by type of school-
leaver, we find that, as expected, less recent school-leavers perform better than 
recent school-leavers (see Table 4.7). This table shows indeed that recent school-
leavers more often have a temporary job than less recent school-leavers. Of all 
recent school-leavers in the European Union, 43 percent has a temporary job, 
whereas of all less recent school-leavers, only 19 percent has a temporary job. 
Evidently, the additional few years of work experience that less recent school-leavers 
(may) have gained, decrease their likelihood of having a temporary job. The 
differences between less recent and recent school-leavers as regards to the 
permanency of the job, are greatest in Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Germany, 
France and Sweden. This indicates that in these countries youngsters have a 
relatively large probability to change their temporary job for a permanent one during 
the transition period. In Spain, although the probability of being in a temporary job is 
substantially lower for less recent school-leavers than for recent ones (the odds ratio 
is 3.01), the absolute share of less recent school-leavers who have a temporary job 
is much higher than in other countries. Nearly 70 percent of all Spanish youngsters 
who left school 1-5 years ago still has a temporary contract. In the European Union 
as a whole, this percentage is only 19 percent. 
 
Table 4.8 differentiates the share of youngsters having a temporary job by level of 
education. In the European Union as a whole, low educated school-leavers run a 
somewhat greater risk of being in a temporary labour market position than high 
educated ones. One third of the low educated employed youngsters in the Member 
States has a temporary job, whereas high educated employed youngsters less 
regularly hold a temporary job (22 percent). Surprisingly enough, intermediate 
educated school-leavers are even less often working on a temporary basis than high 
educated (17 percent). If we look at the individual countries, then we see a mixed 
situation between countries. There are only two countries that behave according to 
the European Union pattern: Germany and the Netherlands. In Denmark, Spain, 
Finland, France, Greece, Portugal and Sweden, there is a negative relationship 
between the probability of youngsters having a temporary job and the level of 
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education attained. In all other countries, school-leavers with a degree in higher 
education are more often working on the basis of a temporary contract than school-
leavers with only basic qualifications. 
 
Table 4.7 
Differences in shares of having a temporary job, by type of school-leaver and country 
 
 
Country recent less recent 
 school-leavers school-leavers 
 % % odds ratio 
 
 
European Union 43 19 3.22 
 
Austria 25 8 3.83 
Belgium 33 13 3.30 
Germany 36 10 5.06 
Denmark 36 13 3.76 
Spain 87 69 3.01 
Finland 67 34 3.82 
France 59 25 4.32 
Greece 36 20 2.25 
Ireland 31 11 3.64 
Italy 37 16 3.08 
Luxembourg 20 3 8.08 
Netherlands 51 15 5.90 
Portugal 54 24 3.72 
Sweden 62 28 4.20 
United Kingdom 26 9 3.55 
 
Source: pooled ECLFS-data 1992-1997 
 
Table 4.8 
Differences in shares of having a temporary job, by educational level and country 
 
 
Country ISCED0-2 ISCED3 ISCED5-7 
 % % % odds ratioa 
 
 
European Union 32 17 22 1.67 
 
Austria 14 7 20 0.65 
Belgium 14 12 18 0.74 
Germany 22 10 13 1.89 
Denmark 27 15 13 2.48 
Spain 82 70 59 3.17 
Finland 62 40 36 2.90 
France 42 29 22 2.57 
Greece 28 20 19 1.66 
Ireland 13 13 15 0.85 
Italy 17 17 21 0.77 
Luxembourg 5 6 7 0.70 
Netherlands 25 13 18 1.52 
Portugal 24 33 33 0.64 
Sweden 44 31 30 1.83 
United Kingdom 12 10 13 0.91 
 
Source: pooled ECLFS-data 1992-1997; a: ISCED0-2 versus ISCED5-7 
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On the European level, there are no gender differences with regard to the proportion 
of school-leavers working in a temporary job (see Table 4.9). Both men and women 
have the same probability of having a temporary contract: 21 percent. There is, of 
course, some cross-country variation, but the differences are moderate. In Germany, 
Spain, Greece and the Netherlands, women are somewhat less often working on a 
temporary basis. In Luxembourg and the United Kingdom, male school-leavers are 
as often working in a temporary job as their female counterparts. In all other 
countries, women are in an advantageous position. 
 
One might argue, however, whether the permanency of a job is a valid key indicator 
to measure the integration of young people into the labour market. If the temporary 
job is voluntary, i.e. it is not the situation on the labour market which urges 
youngsters to accept a temporary job, but it is their wish to have a temporary job, 
then it is no valid key indicator. Only if having a temporary job is involuntary, 
youngsters are restricted in their labour market behaviour and only in that case the 
permanency of the job is important for our analysis. 
 
Table 4.9 
Differences in shares of having a temporary job, by gender and country 
 
 
Country women  men 
 % % odds ratio 
 
 
European Union 21 21 1.00 
 
Austria 10 8 1.28 
Belgium 17 12 1.50 
Germany 9 13 0.66 
Denmark 20 12 1.83 
Spain 68 71 0.87 
Finland 46 33 1.73 
France 29 27 1.10 
Greece 20 22 0.89 
Ireland 16 12 1.40 
Italy 18 17 1.07 
Luxembourg 6 6 1.00 
Netherlands 15 16 0.93 
Portugal 29 25 1.23 
Sweden 39 26 1.82 
United Kingdom 12 12 1.00 
 
Source: pooled ECLFS-data 1992-1997 
 
In Table 4.10, we show the reasons for not having a permanent job. The main reason 
is that school-leavers cannot find a permanent job. This is the case for 44 percent of 
all employed youngsters who have a temporary position. For less recent school-
leavers, this percentage is even somewhat higher (46 percent). Voluntarily accepting 
a temporary job, occurs only in isolated instances (five percent overall) and is no 
serious reason why youngsters accept a temporary job. Therefore, we conclude that 
the permanency of the job is an adequate key indicator to determine the integration 
of young people into the labour market. 
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Table 4.10 
Reasons for having a temporary job, by type of school-leaver 
 
 
Reason total recent less recent 
 school-leavers school-leavers 
 % % % 
 
 
Temporary job including training 11 16 10 
Couldn’t find permanent job 44 33 46 
Temporary job because of probation 5 7 4 
Didn’t want permanent job 5 9 3 
No reason 36 36 37 
 
Source: pooled ECLFS-data 1992-1997 
 
4.4 Having a part-time job 
Another feature of job security is the number of hours per week that school-leavers 
work in their job. In Figure 4.4, we present the share of employed youngsters who 
have a part-time job. It appears that throughout the European Union, the vast majority 
of employed school-leavers has found a full-time job. On average 11 percent of all 
employed youngsters have a part-time job. In some countries, however, the share of 
youngsters who have a part-time job is substantially higher. These countries are 
Sweden (33 percent) and the Netherlands (23 percent). In Luxembourg and Portugal, 
on the other hand, only four percent of all school-leavers works in a part-time job. 
 
Figure 4.4 
Share of school-leavers having a part-time job, by country 
Source: pooled ECLFS-data 1992-1997 
 
Recent school-leavers more often have a part-time job than less recent school-
leavers. This can be concluded from Table 4.11. In the European Union as a whole, 
22 percent of all recent school-leavers has a part-time job, whereas only ten percent 
of all less recent school-leavers works part-time. The corresponding odds ratio is 
2.54. Between countries there is considerable variation with regard to differences 
between recent and less recent school-leavers. In the United Kingdom and Sweden, 
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the differences between recent and less recent school-leavers are largest. In Belgium 
and the Netherlands, the differences are smallest. The contrasting findings for 
Sweden and the Netherlands are very interesting in this respect. These two countries 
have the highest rates of part-time employment within in the European union, but for 
different reasons. In Sweden, the high level of part-time employment appears to be a 
matter of integration into the labour market, whereas in the Netherlands it seems to 
be a more general characteristic of the labour force. 
 
Table 4.11 
Differences in shares of having a part-time job, by type of school-leaver and country 
 
 
Country recent less recent 
 school-leavers school-leavers 
 % % odds ratio 
 
 
European Union 22 10 2.54 
 
Austria 15 8 2.03 
Belgium 14 12 1.19 
Germany 11 6 1.94 
Denmark 24 11 2.56 
Spain 12 7 1.81 
Finland 24 11 2.56 
France 25 15 1.89 
Greece 10 7 1.48 
Ireland 15 6 2.76 
Italy 10 7 1.48 
Luxembourg 8 4 2.09 
Netherlands 28 23 1.30 
Portugal 6 4 1.53 
Sweden 57 30 3.09 
United Kingdom 36 14 3.46 
 
Source: pooled ECLFS-data 1992-1997 
 
Table 4.12 presents the relationship between level of education and part-time 
employment. In the European Union as a whole, lower educated school-leavers are 
more likely to be in a part-time job than higher educated. Of all school-leavers with a 
certificate at the level of ISCED0-2, 15 percent has a part-time job. At the ISCED3 
level, the percentage is 11 and at the ISCED5-7 level it is nine percent. Between 
countries, however, we see a much more differentiated picture. In the Scandinavian 
countries Sweden and Finland, we find the largest variation between levels of 
education. The ratio between the odds of being in a part-time versus full-time job for 
the lowest educated and the corresponding odds for the highest educated in these 
countries, are 9.67 and 7.04, respectively. In other countries, only a very weak 
association (Spain, the Netherlands) or even no association (Austria, Greece) is 
found. Again, it seems that the high rates of part-time employment in Sweden and 
the Netherlands stem from different reasons. In Sweden, part-time employment is 
mainly concentrated among less integrated young people (in this case: lower 
educated), whereas in the Netherlands this form of atypical employment is a general 
feature of the Dutch labour market. Finally, in Italy, Luxembourg and Portugal, it is 
found that higher educated school-leavers more often have a part-time position in the 
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labour market than lower educated ones. These are all countries where part-time 
employment hardly exists anyhow. 
 
Table 4.12 
Differences in shares of having a part-time job, by educational level and country 
 
 
Country ISCED0-2 ISCED3 ISCED5-7 
 % % % odds ratioa 
 
 
European Union 15 11 9 1.78 
 
Austria 13 7 13 1.00 
Belgium 15 13 10 1.59 
Germany 12 5 8 1.57 
Denmark 25 11 11 2.70 
Spain 8 8 7 1.16 
Finland 31 16 6 7.04 
France 25 18 9 3.37 
Greece 8 6 8 1.00 
Ireland 10 8 6 1.74 
Italy 5 7 10 0.47 
Luxembourg 4 2 6 0.65 
Netherlands 27 23 23 1.24 
Portugal 4 4 6 0.65 
Sweden 72 29 21 9.67 
United Kingdom 31 18 9 4.54 
 
Source: pooled ECLFS-data 1992-1997 
a: ISCED0-2 versus ISCED5-7 
 
Gender differences with regard to part-time employment are quite clear (see Table 
4.13). In all Member States, female school-leavers are more often found in part-time 
jobs than their male counterparts. On average, 17 percent of all young women within 
the European Union have a part-time job as against six percent for young men. Of 
course, there is considerable cross-country variation. In Germany, Belgium, Austria, 
the Netherlands and France, the differences between women and men with regard to 
part-time employment are largest, whereas in Greece and Ireland, the differences are 
smallest. 
 
Again, just like having a temporary job, having a part-time job is only interesting for 
the analysis of the integration process of young people into the labour market if their 
part-time status is involuntary. Table 4.14 displays the reasons why youngsters have 
a part-time job. In this table, we see that the majority of school-leavers starts in a 
part-time job involuntarily, due to the fact that they could not find a full-time position 
(43 percent), or that they combine their part-time work with schooling (16 percent). 
The last argument especially applies to recent school-leavers. This confirms the idea 
that the transition from school to work is a process and not just simply a shift from 
full-time education to stable full-time employment.. The third reason why school-
leavers work part time is that they do not want a full-time job (29 percent). This 
percentage is mainly dominated by less recent and female school-leavers. Especially 
for the latter group, part-time employment is a voluntary choice (for instance to make 
time for raising children) rather than lacking opportunities to integrate into the labour 
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market. Other reasons for part-time employment are mentioned only rarely. This 
brings us to the conclusion that, in many cases, part-time employment among 
school-leavers is involuntary and, therefore, seems to be an appropriate measure to 
investigate the integration of young people into the labour market. 
 
Table 4.13 
Differences in shares of having a part-time job, by gender and country 
 
 
Country women  men  
 % % odds ratio 
 
 
European Union 17 6 3.21 
 
Austria 13 3 4.83 
Belgium 20 4 6.00 
Germany 12 2 6.68 
Denmark 20 6 3.92 
Spain 12 5 2.59 
Finland 18 9 2.22 
France 25 7 4.43 
Greece 9 6 1.55 
Ireland 9 6 1.55 
Italy 10 4 2.67 
Luxembourg 7 2 3.69 
Netherlands 35 11 4.36 
Portugal 6 3 2.06 
Sweden 45 21 3.08 
United Kingdom 23 13 2.00 
 
Source: pooled ECLFS-data 1992-1997 
 
Table 4.14 
Reasons for having a part-time job, by type of school-leaver and gender 
 
 
Reason total recent less recent male female 
  school- school- 
  leaver  leaver 
 % % % % % 
 
Combining schooling and part-time work 16 36 10 26 12 
Couldn’t find a full-time job 43 42 44 46 42 
Didn’t want a full-time job 29 14 33 16 34 
Unable to work full-time due to illness 1 0 1 1 1 
Other reason for having part-time work 10 7 11 9 10 
No reason for having part-time work 2 2 2 2 1 
 
Source: pooled ECLFS-data 1992-1997 
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5 The role of institutional settings 
Now that the gross cross-country differences with regard to our four key indicators 
have been described, we try to explain this variation between countries by taking into 
account the impact of institutional arrangements, both with regard to the employment 
system and the education/training system. Moreover, we statistically control for the 
effect of the labour market situation. This gives us insight in the true performance of 
youth labour markets. However, before presenting the results of multilevel analysis, 
applied for this purpose, we need to describe (the operationalisation of) the national 
institutional contexts both with regard to the employment system and the 
education/training system, and the general labour market situation in the various 
countries. 
 
5.1 National institutional contexts 
To measure the level of centralisation and co-ordination of the wage bargaining 
structure in a country, we created three distinct categories. Table 5.1 shows that 
Austria and Germany are defined as countries with a centralised/co-ordinated wage 
bargaining system. Ireland and the United Kingdom are classified as decentralised/ 
unco-ordinated. All other countries within the European Union represent systems in 
which wage bargaining takes place at the intermediate level. 
 
The power of trade unions is operationalised as the percentage of workers who are 
members of a trade union. Trade union membership within the European Union is 
most common in the Scandinavian countries. In France and Spain, on the other 
hand, the union density is rather low. 
 
Employment protection, measured by the overall strictness of employment protection 
legislation, is by far the strictest in the South European countries. In Ireland and the 
United Kingdom, however, the existing labour force has relatively little protection 
against dismissals and other forms of job insecurity. 
 
Active labour market policies for youngsters are operationalised as the percentage of 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) spent on youth measures. From Table 5.1, it can be 
observed that there are considerable differences between European countries with 
regard to the amount of money spent on youth measures. Italy, Portugal, France and 
Ireland spend relatively spoken the largest amounts of money on youth measures, 
whereas in countries such as Austria, Belgium, Sweden, Germany and the 
Netherlands, the percentage of GDP spent on active labour market policies for 
youngsters is relatively small. 
 
In Table 5.2, the countries are classified by institutional characteristics with regard to 
their education/training system. The vocational specificity of the education system is 
operationalised by two indicators. First of all, it is measured by the percentage of 
upper secondary students enrolled in vocational education. Especially in the 
countries around Germany and the Scandinavian countries, secondary education is 
vocational-oriented, whereas in South European and the United Kingdom and 
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Ireland, the general track is predominant within secondary education. In addition, we 
make a distinction between countries that have institutionalised vocational training by 
means of a separate system (‘dual system’), and countries in which vocational 
training is solely school-based. Countries that have a significant dual system are 
Austria, Germany, Denmark, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. 
 
Table 5.1 
National institutional contexts with regard to the employment system 
 
 
Country wage bargaining union employment youth measures 
 structurea density (%)b protectionc (% of GDP)d 
 
 
Austria  3 42 2.2 0.01 
Belgium  2 54 2.6 0.04 
Germany  3 29 2.9 0.07 
Denmark  2 76 1.7 0.20 
Spain  2 19 3.4 0.08 
Finland  2 81 2.1 0.20 
France  2 9 2.9 0.28 
Greece  2 24 3.6 0.03 
Ireland  1 49 0.9 0.28 
Italy  2 39 3.7 0.58 
Luxembourg  2 43 2.5 0.10 
Netherlands  2 26 2.4 0.09 
Portugal  2 32 3.9 0.35 
Sweden  2 91 2.4 0.02 
United Kingdom  1 34 0.5 0.13 
 
a Wage bargaining structure is a combined indicator that measures the degree of centralisation 
and co-ordination of the wage bargaining system in a country. The values are based on data 
for 1994, as reported in OECD Employment Outlook of 1997 (OECD, 1997: Table 3.3). A ‘3’ 
indicates a centralised/co-ordinated wage bargaining structure, a ‘2’ is assigned to countries 
with an intermediate wage bargaining structure and a ‘1’ refers to countries where wage 
bargaining is decentralised/unco-ordinated. The value for Ireland is based on Nickell and 
Layard (1997). Greece and Luxembourg are, for lack of data, assigned to the European Union 
average. 
b Trade union density is based on the rates of 1994 as published in OECD Employment 
Outlook of 1997 (OECD 1997: Table 3.3). The figures for Greece and Ireland stem from 
Ebbinghaus and Visser (1999) and are the rates of 1995. The union density rate for 
Luxembourg is the unweighted average of the other countries. 
c Employment protection is measured by the overall strictness of employment protection 
legislation (EPL) in a country, as published in OECD Employment Outlook of 1999 (OECD, 
1999: Table 2.5). This summary indicator refers to protection with regard to both regular and 
temporary employment. The figures used here are the averages of the scores for the late 
1980s and late 1990s. The figure for Luxembourg is computed as the unweighted average of 
all other countries, since there is no data available for this country.       
d Youth measures are based on the percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) spent on 
these measures in a country averaged over the period 1992-1997. The original yearly 
percentages were reported in OECD Employment Outlook of 1996 (OECD, 1996: Table T), 
1997 (OECD, 1997: Table K), 1998 (OECD, 1998: Table J) and 1999 (OECD, 1999: Table H).  
 
Related to the vocational specificity is the stratification of the education system. In 
this study, we define the secondary education systems of Austria, Germany, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands as highly stratified, in the sense that pupils are 
differentiated into tracks very early in their educational careers (at the end of primary 
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education already). The South European and Scandinavian countries, on the other 
hand, represent countries with a low degree of stratification of secondary education. 
 
The selectivity of the education system is operationalised as the percentage of the 
population that has attained tertiary education. It is assumed that in countries in 
which the attainment of tertiary education is high, the education system is more 
expanded and, therefore, less selective. From Table 5.2, we see that the highest 
percentages can be found in Belgium, Sweden, Ireland, Denmark and Spain. Austria, 
Italy and Portugal, show the lowest proportions of persons with higher education.  
 
Table 5.2 
National institutional contexts with regard to the education/training system 
 
 
Country vocational dual stratification tertiary 
 specificity systemb sec. educ.c education 
 sec. educ.a   qual.d 
 (%)  (%) 
 
 
Austria 76 1 2 8 
Belgium 59 0 1 29 
Germany 80 1 2 21 
Denmark 56 1 0 25 
Spain 41 0 1 24 
Finland 54 0 0 22 
France 54 0 1 23 
Greece 21 0 1 18 
Ireland 0 0 0 27 
Italy 67 0 1 8 
Luxembourg 54 1 2 18 
Netherlands 70 1 2 23 
Portugal 14 0 0 12 
Sweden 76 0 0 26 
United Kingdom 58 0 0 23 
 
a Vocational specificity of secondary education is measured as the percentage of upper 
secondary students enrolled in public and private vocational education (including 
apprenticeships). The figures were reported in OECD Education at a Glance 1995 (OECD, 
1995: Table P03(B)). The percentages for Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal and 
Sweden are based on Figure 9 of Müller and Wolbers (1999).  
b A ‘1’ represents countries with an apprenticeship system in which learning and working are 
combined (‘dual system’). All other countries are assigned to category ‘0’, which indicates the 
absence of an elaborated dual system. 
c Stratification of secondary education is based on Table 1.1.a of Müller and Shavit (1999). It is 
coded as follows: a ‘0’ represents the prevalence of comprehensive schools which may or 
may not practise curricular and/or ability-based tracking. A ‘1’ represents a prevalence of 
between-school tracking such that those on the academic track usually attend separate 
schools from those on the lower or vocational track. A ‘2’ represents an extreme form of 
stratification with very early differentiation among a multitude of programmes. For Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Finland, Greece, Luxembourg and Portugal, all of which are 
countries that are missing in Müller and Shavit (1999), we took the information on the 
stratification of secondary education as reported in Hannan et al. (1999) and OECD (1995). 
d Percentage of the population (25-59 years of age) that has attained any degree in tertiary 
education (ISCED5-7) is used as an indicator of the selectivity of the education system. The 
figures originate from Figure 2 of Müller and Wolbers (1999). 
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Figure 5.1 
Aggregate unemployment rates, by country and period 
Source: pooled ECLFS-data 1992-1997 
 
5.2 General labour market situation 
To take differences in the general labour market situation between countries over 
time into account, we introduce aggregate unemployment rates into our analysis. The 
unemployment levels are based on the unemployed labour force aged between 15 
and 59 years. The cross-country variation of trends over the period 1992-1997 is 
presented in Figure 5.1. From this figure, it can be observed that countries are 
indeed at different stages of the business cycle. In countries such as Germany, we 
find a rather low, but increasing level of unemployment. In countries such as Ireland, 
on the other hand, a clear decrease in the overall unemployment rate can be 
observed. Other countries show a fluctuating trend over time. In the Netherlands, for 
instance, we observe a rising percentage of unemployed people for the first years, 
followed by a decline in the later years. 
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5.3 Odds of being out of the labour force 
Table 5.3 presents the results of multilevel analysis related to the odds of being out 
of the labour force. Model 0 gives an estimation of the systematic variation between 
countries (‘between-country variation’) and the variation within countries between the 
different time periods (‘within-country variation’). Because of the dichotomous nature 
of the dependent variable, the variation at the individual level cannot be estimated 
and, therefore, is fixed at the value 1. The same applies for the other dependent 
variables in this chapter. Consequently, we are not able to estimate the extent to 
which this variation can be explained by the predictors in the different models. Nor 
can the variation between countries or between time periods be expressed as a 
proportion of the total variance. The different variance components are displayed at 
the bottom of the table. The variance component of Model 0 shows the ‘gross’ 
variation between countries in the odds of being out of the labour force. This gross 
variation is in principle the same as the differences in labour force participation 
shown earlier in Figure 4.1. The gross variation between countries amounts to 0.174 
and is significant (p < 0.05), which means that there are significant differences 
between countries in the odds of school-leavers being out of the labour force. At the 
same time, however, the within-country variation is also significant and about the 
same magnitude as the between-country variation, namely 0.141. This means that 
the differences in labour force participation within a country between the years is 
about as large as the differences between the countries.  
 
Model 1 includes the individual characteristics: type of school-leaver, level of 
education and gender. All of these variables have a significant effect on the odds of 
being out of the labour force. For a recent school-leaver the odds of being out of the 
labour force is almost three times higher (e1.070 = 2.915) than the corresponding odds 
for a less recent school-leaver. There are large effects of the attained level of 
education. For persons who have left education at ISCED0-2 level, the odds is 3.445 
(e1.237) times higher than for those who left at ISCED5-7 level, while for those who left 
at ISCED3 level, the odds increases with 81 percent (e0.591 = 1.806). Being a female 
also increases the odds of being out of the labour force, although the effect is far less 
important than the effect of the other two variables. Interesting is the fact that the 
introduction of these individual-level variables also influences the differences 
between the countries and especially the differences within the countries between 
the years. The remaining variance at the period level decreases from 0.141 in Model 
0 to 0.046 in Model 1, indicating that about two thirds [(0.141-0.046)/0.141] of the 
original differences between the years are due to the individual characteristics. To a 
lesser extent, the same applies for the between-country variation. Here the remaining 
variance decreases from 0.174 to 0.135, indicating that about one quarter of  the 
original differences between countries can be attributed to differences between 
individuals. Further analysis (not shown here) reveals that the decrease in the 
variance component at the period level is mainly due to the type of school-leaver 
variable and, to a lesser extent, to the level of education. This can be interpreted as 
follows. Within a country, the participation rate of school-leavers varies from year to 
year. This variation is mainly due to different integration processes of especially 
recent school-leavers. One possible cause of this within-country variation may be the 
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abolition of compulsory military service, or different reaction patterns of recent 
school-leavers and/or school-leavers from the lower educational levels to changes in 
the employment situation: when the prospects on the labour market are bad, recent 
school-leavers and school-leavers from the lower educational levels ‘choose’ 
temporarily not to participate in the labour force (the so-called ‘discouraged-worker 
effect’). 
 
Model 2 seems to indicate that this discouraged-worker effect indeed takes place: the 
aggregate unemployment rate has a significant effect on the odds of being out of the 
labour force. Each percentage increase in the aggregate unemployment rate, 
increases the odds of school-leavers being out of the labour force with five percent 
(e0.047=1.048). The effects of the individual-level variables remain largely unchanged, 
indicating that these operate independently from the general employment situation. 
Differences in the aggregate unemployment rates do explain a significant portion of 
the between-country variation, where the residual variance decreases from 0.135 to 
0.093, indicating that almost half of the original variance between countries can be 
explained by differences in the composition of the population of school-leavers (type 
of school-leaver, level of education, gender) and by differences in the general 
employment situation.  
 
In a sense, one can argue that the variables in Model 2 explain only one part of the 
differences in the integration process. One can consider the differences between 
countries in the integration of young people as the sum of two components. One 
relates to the above-mentioned factors: differences in the composition of the 
population of school-leavers and differences in general employment conditions. Both 
factors are more generic in nature and relate to the integration process in general. 
The other component relates to the institutional differences between countries. These 
can relate to characteristics of the employment system and/or the education system. 
Both institutional contexts can have an effect on the integration process of young 
people into the labour market. These national institutional factors are included in 
Models 3 to 5. 
 
Model 3 includes characteristics of the employment system. These characteristics 
indicate whether the system is ‘open’ for newcomers on the labour market or whether 
it intends to protect the existing labour force from these newcomers. None of the 
indicators included seem to have any effect at all on the odds of school-leavers being 
forced out of the labour force. Consequently, there is no change in the residual 
variance at the within-country or the between-country level. 
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In Model 4, we include characteristics of the education and training system. Here we 
see that for countries that have a dual system, the odds of school-leavers being out 
of the labour force is 0.579 (e-0.524) times smaller than the corresponding odds for 
countries that do not have a dual system. The introduction of this variable causes the 
residual variance to drop from 0.093 in Model 2 to 0.066 in Model 4. This finding 
clearly supports hypothesis 5. The other characteristics of the education/training 
system have no significant effect. They even seem to deteriorate the model fit given 
the further decrease of the residual between-country variation in Model 5, in which 
only the significant variables are included. Note that the effect of the variable dual 
system is not per se related to the vocational specificity of the education system. As 
dual systems are by definition strongly vocation-oriented, it is important to distinguish 
between these two characteristics. The positive effect of having a dual system on the 
integration process of young people, stems from the strong allocation function of the 
dual system: the pathway it provides for young people to enter the labour market. 
The effect does not seem so much to be related to the more strongly vocational 
orientation of countries with a dual system, since the effect of the proportion of 
secondary education students enrolled in vocational programmes is not significant. 
 
The conclusion is that there are significant differences between countries and within 
countries between the years, in the odds of being out of the labour force. The largest 
part of the differences between countries and between different periods within 
countries can be explained by the variables in our model. The most important are: 
the composition of the population of school-leavers with respect to type of school-
leaver, level of education and gender, differences in the general employment 
situation and the existence of a dual system. Together, these characteristics explain 
three quarters of the original differences within countries between the different time 
periods, as well as three quarters of the original differences between countries.  
 
The effects of these variables become most clear if we look at the so-called ‘posterior 
means’ (see the Appendix for a detailed interpretation of posterior means). In 
principal, a posterior mean reflects the performance of a country as a deviation from 
the overall performance within the European Union, possibly after controlling for 
other variables. Figure 5.2 displays the posterior means for three different models. 
The posterior means of Model 0 are similar to the observed percentages of Figure 
4.1. However, these percentages are now expressed as deviations from the overall 
percentage within the European Union, in a somewhat different scale (a log odds 
ratio scale). Nevertheless, the pattern of differences in performance between the 
countries follows exactly the description of the differences as presented earlier. We 
see high proportions in the United Kingdom, Finland and Ireland, and low proportions 
in Luxembourg and the Netherlands. The posterior means of the countries in the 
other two models show what happens if certain variables are controlled for. Take for 
example the case of Finland. Model 0 shows a very low performance (i.e. very high 
posterior mean) for Finland, indicating that this country has a very large proportion of 
school-leavers being out of the labour force. The reduction of the posterior mean in 
Model 2 shows that the low performance of Finland can largely be ascribed to the 
fact that it has an unfavourable employment situation and an unfavourable 
composition of the population of school-leavers. After all, the deviation of Finland 
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from the overall performance within the European Union almost disappears if one 
controls for these variables. The same applies to Ireland. In the case of the United 
Kingdom, however, the same characteristics do not seem to contribute a great deal 
to the deviation from the overall performance. Instead, the position of the United 
Kingdom is better explained by the fact that the United Kingdom does not have a 
dual system, considering the drop in the deviation in Model 5. However, there are 
other factors that cause the United Kingdom to have a relatively high proportion of 
school-leavers out of the labour force, given the fact that the posterior mean of the 
United Kingdom in Model 5 is still relatively large.   
 
At the other side of the spectre, we can see that the relatively low proportions of 
school-leavers being out of the labour force in countries such as Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Austria, Germany and Denmark, is largely due to the presence of a dual 
system. The posterior means in these countries show a large difference between 
Models 2 and 5, that is after controlling for the existence of a dual system. In the 
case of Austria, Germany and Luxembourg, a favourable composition of the 
population of school-leavers and/or a favourable general employment situation also 
seem to play a role. In Denmark, the low proportion of school-leavers being out of the 
labour force can fully be explained by the existence of a dual system. 
 
Figure 5.2  
Cross-country performance with regard to being out of the labour force 
Source: pooled ECLFS-data 1992-1997 
 
5.4 Odds of being unemployed 
Table 5.4 displays the results of multilevel analysis with respect to the odds of being 
unemployed. Model 0 again gives the variation between the countries, without any 
control for other variables. The analysis shows that there are significant differences 
between countries in the odds of becoming unemployed (between-country variation 
is 0.640). There is also a significant variation within countries between the different 
time periods (0.019), but these differences are rather small compared to the 
systematic variation between countries.  
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The introduction of individual characteristics in Model 1 shows that the odds of 
becoming unemployed is significantly affected by the personal background of school-
leavers. For recent school-leavers, the odds of being unemployed versus being 
employed is two times larger than the corresponding odds for less recent school-
leavers (e0.712 = 2.038). Those who have left education at the ISCED0-2 level also 
have unfavourable chances on the labour market. Their odds of being unemployed is 
94 percent higher (e0.665 = 1.944) than the odds for the group of school-leavers who 
left education at the tertiary level (ISCED5-7). Those who left education at the 
intermediate level (ISCED3) hold an intermediate position. The figures show that 
women have higher chances of becoming unemployed than men. The implied odds 
ratio is 1.179 (e0.165). In contrast to the analysis of being out of the labour force, none 
of the individual characteristics seem to have an effect on the differences in 
unemployment among youngsters between time periods or between countries. This 
indicates that these differences are related to other factors than compositional effects 
of the population of school-leavers in the different countries. 
 
Not surprisingly, the most important of these other factors is the general labour 
market situation. After controlling for the aggregate unemployment rate in Model 2, 
the residual variance component decreases at the country level from 0.644 to 0.221 
and at the period level from 0.023 to 0.002. In other words, around two thirds of the 
systematic differences between countries and over 90 percent of the within-country 
variation can be statistically explained by differences in the general labour market 
situation. This means that the unemployment risk of school-leavers is primarily 
determined by general employment conditions, which also affect the rest of the 
labour force. Still, there are significant differences left, especially at the country level. 
 
Model 3 shows that about half of these remaining differences between countries can 
be explained by the institutional arrangements in the labour market system. In 
countries that are characterised by a strong employment protection for the existing 
labour force, school-leavers have a much higher probability of being unemployed 
than in countries that are more open to newcomers. This corroborates hypothesis 3. 
The wage bargaining structure also has the hypothesised effect on the 
unemployment rate among school-leavers (see hypothesis 1). Countries 
characterised by a centralised/co-ordinated wage bargaining structure are more open 
for newcomers on the labour market than decentralised/unco-ordinated countries 
and, consequently, show lower unemployment rates among labour market entrants. 
There is no significant effect of specific youth measures taken, although the sign is in 
the expected direction, i.e. the more a country spends on specific youth measures, 
the lower the unemployment risk for school-leavers. However, the ‘real’ effect of 
youth measures may be hidden. As youth measures in general are taken only in the 
case of high youth unemployment rates, the effect may be counterbalanced by the 
unfavourable youth unemployment conditions. Finally, union density does not seem 
to have any effect at all on the odds of becoming unemployed for school-leavers. 
 
 Ta
bl
e 
5.
4 
R
es
ul
ts
 o
f l
og
is
tic
 3
-le
ve
l a
na
ly
si
s 
of
 b
ei
ng
 u
ne
m
pl
oy
ed
 
  M
od
el
 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
 5 
  C
on
st
an
t 
-1
.4
89
**
* 
-2
.1
55
**
* 
-3
.4
81
**
* 
-3
.5
16
**
* 
-3
.1
55
**
* 
-3
.7
21
**
* 
Ty
pe
 o
f s
ch
oo
l-l
ea
ve
r 
 
R
ec
en
t 
 
0.
71
2*
**
 
0.
78
4*
**
 
0.
80
0*
**
 
0.
80
1*
**
 
0.
80
1*
**
 
 
Le
ss
 re
ce
nt
 
 
re
f. 
re
f. 
re
f. 
re
f. 
re
f. 
Le
ve
l o
f e
du
ca
tio
n 
 
IS
C
ED
0-
2 
 
0.
66
5*
**
 
0.
72
4*
**
 
0.
72
9*
**
 
0.
73
1*
**
 
0.
73
0*
**
 
 
IS
C
ED
3 
 
0.
46
6*
**
 
0.
50
5*
**
 
0.
50
7*
**
 
0.
50
9*
**
 
0.
50
8*
**
 
 
IS
C
ED
5-
7 
 
re
f. 
re
f. 
re
f. 
re
f. 
re
f. 
Se
x 
 
M
al
e 
 
re
f. 
re
f. 
re
f. 
re
f. 
re
f. 
 
Fe
m
al
e 
 
0.
16
5*
**
 
0.
18
0*
**
 
0.
18
3*
**
 
0.
18
4*
**
 
0.
18
4*
**
 
Ag
gr
eg
at
e 
un
em
pl
oy
m
en
t r
at
e 
(%
) 
 
 
0.
10
5*
**
 
0.
10
5*
**
 
0.
10
4*
**
 
0.
10
2*
**
 
W
ag
e 
ba
rg
ai
ni
ng
 s
tru
ct
ur
e 
 
 
 
-0
.5
85
**
 
 
-0
.0
44
 
U
ni
on
 d
en
si
ty
 (%
) 
 
 
 
0.
00
3 
Em
pl
oy
m
en
t p
ro
te
ct
io
n 
 
 
 
0.
43
4*
**
 
 
0.
20
7*
 
Yo
ut
h 
m
ea
su
re
s 
(%
 o
f G
D
P)
 
 
 
 
-0
.2
86
 
 
Vo
ca
tio
na
l s
pe
ci
fic
ity
 s
ec
. e
du
ca
tio
n 
(%
) 
 
 
 
 
0.
00
2 
D
ua
l s
ys
te
m
 
 
 
 
 
-0
.9
28
**
* 
-0
.6
46
**
 
St
ra
tif
ic
at
io
n 
se
c.
 e
du
ca
tio
n 
 
 
 
 
0.
11
1 
Te
rti
ar
y 
ed
uc
at
io
n 
qu
al
ifi
ca
tio
ns
 (%
) 
 
 
 
 
-0
.0
12
 
 Va
ria
nc
e 
co
m
po
ne
nt
s 
 
sc
ho
ol
-le
av
er
 le
ve
l (
N
 =
 1
50
,3
32
) 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
 
pe
rio
d 
le
ve
l (
N
 =
 8
0)
 
0.
01
9*
**
 
0.
02
3*
**
 
0.
00
2*
* 
0.
00
2*
* 
0.
00
2*
* 
0.
00
2*
* 
 
co
un
try
 le
ve
l (
N
 =
 1
5)
 
0.
64
0*
**
 
0.
65
4*
**
 
0.
22
1*
**
 
0.
11
5*
* 
0.
12
7*
**
 
0.
07
9*
* 
 * =
 p
 <
 0
.1
0;
 **
 =
 p
 <
 0
.0
5;
 **
* =
 p
 <
 0
.0
1;
 re
f. 
= 
re
fe
re
nc
e 
ca
te
go
ry
; S
ou
rc
e:
 p
oo
le
d 
EC
LF
S-
da
ta
 1
99
2-
19
97
 
 44 
In Model 4, characteristics of the education and training system are included. The 
results are fairly straightforward. Countries with a dual system have lower 
unemployment rates among school-leavers than countries without a dual system. 
Again, this finding supports hypothesis 5. Also note again that the effect of the dual 
system on unemployment probabilities is not related to the vocational orientation of 
dual systems, but rather to the effect it has on the allocation of young people. 
 
Model 5 integrates Models 3 and 4 by taking up only the significant variables of the 
two models. We can see that both types of factors have their own independent effect 
on the unemployment risk of school-leavers. Taken together, the three variables 
explain a large part of the residual variance in Model 2. In other words, the country 
differences in unemployment rates among youngsters can largely be explained by 
general differences in the labour market situation in these countries. Countries with a 
high aggregate unemployment rate also have a high unemployment rate among 
school-leavers. The remaining differences can be attributed to differences in 
institutional arrangements, namely employment protection, the wage bargaining 
structure and the existence of a dual system. Both the differences between countries 
and the differences within countries between the years can for almost 90 percent be 
explained by the variables in the model. 
 
Figure 5.3 
Cross-country performance with regard to being unemployed 
Source: pooled ECLFS-data 1992-1997 
 
Figure 5.3 presents the posterior means again. The figure displays the performance 
score of each country as a deviation from the overall performance score within the 
European Union. It can immediately be seen that the deviations of the countries are 
almost fully explained by the variables in the model. The extremely high 
unemployment rate among school-leavers in Spain and Finland (see Model 0), for 
example, is fully explained by the aggregate unemployment level in both countries. 
Statistically controlled for that effect, unemployment among youngsters in Spain and 
Finland is about the same as the overall youth unemployment within the European 
Union (see Model 2). The same applies to Italy: the high unemployment rate for 
school-leavers in that country can fully be explained by an unfavourable general 
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employment situation and by the national institutional context (high employment 
protection and the absence of a dual system). Greece seems to be a bit of an 
exception. The high unemployment rate among youngsters in that country can only 
partly be explained by the institutional factors in the model, given the fact that in 
Model 5 Greece still shows a relatively high unemployment among them. 
 
Conversely, the low unemployment rates in countries such as Austria, Germany, 
Denmark, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, seem to be caused primarily by the 
existence of a dual system in these countries and furthermore by favourable general 
employment conditions. Denmark also profits from a low strictness of employment 
protection, while Austria and Germany seem to profit from the centralised/co-
ordinated wage bargaining structure. 
 
5.5 Odds of having a temporary job 
Table 5.5 presents the results of the next analysis: the odds of having a temporary 
job. Model 0 again describes the variance between countries and within countries 
between the years. The variation between countries seems larger than in the 
previous analysis: 0.943 as against 0.640 with respect to the odds of being 
unemployed. 
 
In Model 1 the individual characteristics are introduced in the analysis. The largest 
effect stems from the type of school-leaver. For recent school-leavers, the odds of 
having a temporary job is more than three times higher than for less recent school-
leavers (e1.145). Furthermore, low educated school-leavers (ISCED0-2) are more 
often in temporary positions than high educated ones (ISCED5-7). The implied odds 
ratio is 1.428 (e0.356). There is no effect of gender on the odds of having a temporary 
job. Both females and males run the same risk of having temporary work. None of 
these individual characteristics have any effect on the overall variation between 
countries. 
 
Variation between countries with regard to the likelihood of school-leavers having a 
temporary job, is heavily affected by the differences in the overall employment 
situation (see Model 2). For each percentage of increase in a country’s 
unemployment rate, the odds for school-leavers having a temporary job increase 
1.048 (e0.047). Almost half of the original between-country variation can be explained 
by differences in the unemployment situation of the different countries. Interestingly, 
the within-country variation does not appear to be affected by the aggregate 
unemployment level. The variation within a country between the different time 
periods was already very small (only 0.013 as compared to 0.943 for the between-
country variation). Apparently, the variation over time is caused by other factors than 
the general labour market situation in a particular year. 
 
In Model 3 the institutional characteristics of the employment system are introduced. 
As stated in hypothesis 3, in countries that are characterised by strict employment 
protection legislation, the likelihood of having a temporary job is higher than in 
countries with less strict employment protection legislation. The effects of two other 
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institutional contexts with regard to the employment system (youth measures and the 
wage bargaining structure) also point in the expected direction, but these are not 
significant. Finally, there is no effect of trade union density. In total, the institutional 
factors regarding the employment system cause a drop in the between-country 
variation from 0.526 in Model 2 to 0.466 in Model 3. This implies a reduction of some 
10 percent. 
 
Model 4 introduces the impact of different institutional contexts of the education and 
training system. Although having a dual system in a country seem to lower the odds 
of having a temporary job for school-leavers, the difference is just insignificant (p > 
0.10). The other characteristics do not seem to have any effect at all. 
 
The last model (Model 5) includes only the significant effect of employment 
protection. The variables in the model explain about half of the original between-
country variation. This means that there are still significant differences left 
unexplained. Figure 5.4 shows this for each country separately. In the figure, one can 
clearly see the huge differences in the gross performance between countries with 
regard to school-leavers having a temporary job. Spain and Finland have a very high 
score - indicating a relatively high proportion of temporary employment - and 
Luxembourg, on the other hand, a very low one. The figure also shows that the 
disadvantageous position of Spain can partly be ascribed to its bad labour market 
circumstances in general, as well as its high degree of employment protection. 
However, these factors do not explain the relatively high score of Finland, nor the 
relatively low score of Luxembourg. It seems that for some countries (the United 
Kingdom, Spain, Portugal and Denmark), the model does a good job in explaining 
the country’s position, whereas for other countries (Belgium, Germany, Finland, 
France and Luxembourg) the model does not explain very well the proportion of 
school-leavers having a temporary job. In the case of Italy and Sweden, the model 
even enlarges the original differences, indicating that other factors in these two 
countries cause the country’s specific position. 
 
Figure 5.4 
Cross-country performance with regard to having a temporary job 
Source: pooled ECLFS-data 1992-1997 
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5.6 Odds of having a part-time job 
The final analysis relates to the odds of school-leavers having a part-time job (see 
Table 5.6). Model 0 indicates that there are significant differences between the 
countries, as has already been described in Figure 4.4. The model also shows 
significant variation between the different time periods within a country, but this 
variation is small compared to the between-country variation (0.027 versus. 0.606).  
 
All individual characteristics in Model 1 have a significant effect on the odds of having 
a part-time job. Not surprisingly, female school-leavers have a much larger likelihood 
of having part-time work than their male counterparts. For women, the odds of having 
a part-time versus full-time job is three-and-a-half times higher than the 
corresponding odds for men (e1.240 = 3.456). Similarly, recent school-leavers run a 
two times larger risk of having part-time work than less recent school-leavers (e0.732 = 
2.079). Finally, the level of education determines the individual chances of having 
part-time work: the higher the level of education, the lower the probability of having a 
part-time job. 
 
The general employment situation in a country does not relate in any way to that 
country’s proportion of school-leavers having part-time work (Model 2). The increase 
in the between-country variation between Model 1 and Model 2 indicates that adding 
the aggregate unemployment rate to the model even deteriorates the model fit.  
 
In Model 3, where the institutional characteristics of the employment system are 
added to the model, the employment situation does have an effect on the country’s 
proportion of school-leavers having a part-time job. Apparently the effect of the 
employment situation is correlated with institutional characteristics of the labour 
market. 
 
Model 4 brings about a significant improvement of the model. This relates especially 
to the vocational specificity of secondary education and to the expansion of tertiary 
education. The more vocation-specific a country’s secondary education is, the higher 
the proportion of school-leavers having part-time work. So, with respect to part-time 
employment hypothesis 5 has been falsified. In addition, the more the tertiary 
education system has expanded, the higher the overall proportion of part-time work 
in that country. This finding corroborates hypothesis 7. Note, however, that this effect 
controls for the individual effect of level of education. For each individual, the odds of 
having part-time work is negatively correlated with his/her level of education. But the 
more individuals have attained tertiary education in a specific country, the higher the 
odds of having a part-time job for school-leavers in that country, regardless of their 
own level of education. 
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Introducing only the significant characteristics of the country’s education system in 
the model (Model 5) explains about half of the original differences between the 
countries. Figure 5.5 displays the posterior means for each country in the Models 0, 2 
and 5. The figure clearly shows the large differences in the proportion of young 
people having part-time work between Sweden and the Netherlands on the one 
hand, and Luxembourg and Portugal on the other hand. It also shows that the 
posterior means in the countries do no change between Model 0 and Model 2, 
indicating that the differences between the countries cannot be explained by 
individual characteristics and the general labour market conditions. The educational 
characteristics of Model 5 do seem to explain the specific position of countries such 
as Sweden, Portugal, the Netherlands, Italy, Greece, Ireland, Belgium and Austria. 
However, these characteristics do not explain the position of some of the other 
countries, most notably Luxembourg, Spain and France. In these countries other 
factors cause the country-specific position with respect to the proportion of school-
leavers having part-time work. 
 
Figure 5.5 
Cross-country performance with regard to having a part-time job 
Source: pooled ECLFS-data 1992-1997 
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6 Conclusions and discussion 
In this study we investigated to what extent national institutional arrangements both 
with regard to the employment system and the education/training system affect the 
integration of young people into the labour market within the European Union. The 
aim was to determine differences in the integration process between countries and to 
relate this cross-country variation to differences in national institutional contexts. For 
this purpose, data of the European Community Labour Force Surveys (ECLFS) for 
the period 1992-1997 were used. This combined data set provides information about 
four important indicators that capture the (lack of) labour market integration of 
youngsters: the likelihood of being out of the labour force, being unemployed, having 
a temporary job and having a part-time job. To estimate systematic variation between 
countries adequately, we applied multilevel analysis to the data in which is 
statistically controlled for variation within countries between individuals and for 
variation within countries between years. A detailed overview of the results per 
country is presented in Table 6.1. Here, we mainly focus on those countries 
presenting extreme positions in the analysis. 
 
The findings with regard to the likelihood of being out of the labour force show that 
there are substantial differences between countries. High proportions of inactivity 
among school-leavers can be found in the United Kingdom, Finland and Ireland; low 
proportions in the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Austria, Belgium, Germany, and 
Denmark. The characteristics under investigation explain about three quarters of the 
observed differences between the various countries. In Finland, for instance, the very 
large proportion of school-leavers being out of the labour force can for a great part be 
ascribed to the fact that this country has an unfavourable general employment 
situation. In the case of the United Kingdom, however, the labour market situation 
does not seem to contribute a great deal. Instead, the relatively disadvantageous 
position of the United Kingdom is better explained by the fact that it does not have a 
dual system. However, there are still other, not investigated factors that cause the 
United Kingdom to have a high proportion of the school-leavers out of the labour 
force. The relatively low proportions of school-leavers being out of the labour force in 
countries such as Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Germany, and Denmark, 
can largely be ascribed to the existence of substantial apprenticeship systems in 
these countries. 
 
The likelihood of being unemployed also differs strongly between countries. High 
proportions of unemployment are found in Italy, Spain, Greece and Finland, whereas 
low unemployment rates are observed in Luxembourg, Austria, Germany, Denmark 
and the Netherlands. This cross-country variation in youth unemployment rates is 
almost fully explained by differences in the general labour market situation and 
varying institutional contexts with respect to employment protection, wage bargaining 
and the presence of a dual system. For example, the extremely high unemployment 
rates among school-leavers in Spain and Finland can be attributed entirely to the 
high general levels of unemployment in the two countries. The same applies to Italy: 
the high unemployment rate for school-leavers in that country can mainly be 
explained by an unfavourable general employment situation. Furthermore, high 
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employment protection of the working labour force and the absence of a dual system 
hinder Italian school-leavers to find a job. Greece seems to have an exceptional 
position. Its high level of unemployment among school-leavers can only partly be 
explained by the institutional factors measured in this study. On the other hand, the 
low youth unemployment rates in the German surrounding countries seem to be 
caused primarily by the existence of an elaborated dual system, even after taking the 
favourable general employment conditions in these countries into account. Danish 
school-leavers also profit from a low strictness of employment protection. In Austria 
and Germany the centralised/co-ordinated wage bargaining structure also lowers the 
youth unemployment rate in both countries. 
 
There are huge country differences in the performance with regard to school-leavers 
having a temporary job. Especially in Spain and, to a lesser extent, in Finland, 
school-leavers often start in a job with a temporary contract. In Luxembourg and 
Austria, on the other hand, the proportion of youngsters who are working on the 
temporary basis is very low. About half of the cross-country variation can be 
explained by the effects of the general labour market situation and the degree of 
employment protection of the existing labour force. So, the high proportion of 
temporary employment in Spain, for example, can basically be ascribed to its bad 
labour market circumstances in general and its high degree of employment 
protection. The other half can be explained by other, non-measured country 
characteristics. 
 
Large differences with regard to the proportion of young people having part-time work 
are observed as well within the European Union. Sweden and the Netherlands have 
the highest rates of part-time employment. In Luxembourg and Portugal, on the other 
hand, only a few percent of all school-leavers work in a part-time job. The differences 
between the countries can neither be explained by individual characteristics, nor by 
general labour market conditions. Instead, two indicators reflecting the educational 
participation determine to a large extent the rate of part-time employment in a 
country. Firstly, it is found that the more youngsters follow a vocational programme in 
secondary education, the higher the proportion of school-leavers having part-time 
work. Secondly, we observed that the higher the attainment of tertiary education is, 
the higher the proportion of part-time employment among school-leavers. In some 
countries, however, these two educational characteristics do not explain their position 
within the European Union. In these countries, most notably Luxembourg, Spain, and 
France, other factors cause the country-specific performance with respect to the 
proportion of school-leavers having part-time work. 
 
Overall, it can be concluded from these results that the labour market integration of 
young people within the European Union is indeed systematically structured by 
national institutional contexts. With regard to national institutional factors concerning 
labour market regulations, it is primarily the employment protection of the existing 
labour force that has a damaging effect on the integration process of youngsters. In 
countries with a less strict employment protection legislation, school-leavers find a 
(stable) labour market position more easily than in countries with a high strictness of 
employment protection. In addition, the wage bargaining structure plays a role, with 
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centralised/co-ordinated systems performing better than decentralised/unco-
ordinated ones in terms of unemployment among school-leavers. These two findings 
confirm empirically the supposed insider-outsider dichotomy in the labour market. 
Unexpectedly, trade union power and active youth labour market policies do not have 
any effect on the integration process of youngsters into the labour market. The 
absence of an effect of active labour market policies does not imply that these 
policies are not effective. As the occurrence of these policies are also related to the 
severeness of youth unemployment in a specific country, the causal relation between 
the two is hard to disentangle. 
 
With regard to institutional characteristics of education/training systems, it is clear 
that the presence of an extensive dual system - as a workplace-based vocational 
training system - improves the transition from school to work in a country. The 
positive effect of having a dual system on the labour market integration of youngsters 
stems from the strong allocation function of the dual system: the institutionalised 
pathway it provides for young people to enter the labour market. The effect does not 
seem so much to be related to the more vocational orientation of countries with a 
dual system, since the occupational specificity of vocational education does not play 
an important role in the integration process. The stratification of the education system 
neither has an impact on the transition from school to work. 
  
Furthermore, it turned out that the indicators for the measurement of youth labour 
market integration show quite similar results and are, therefore, coherent key 
indicators. Only with respect to part-time employment it seems that this labour market 
outcome is a less appropriate indicator. First of all, the cross-county variation 
regarding part-time employment could not be explained by the factors that are - to a 
large extent - responsible for the country differences with respect to the other 
indicators. Part-time employment among young people in a country is neither 
influenced by the general labour market situation nor by the degree of employment 
protection legislation and/or the provision of a dual system in that country. In addition, 
part-time employment is hardly correlated at the country level with the other 
indicators for the integration of young people into the labour market, whereas these 
other indicators are fairly strong interrelated. In this study, part-time employment has 
only been considered in relation to young people only, while it would have been 
interesting to compare young people with more experienced workers in that respect. 
It might well be that a high percentage of part-time work in a country is not a 
characteristic of the youth labour market, but a more generalised feature of the 
labour market of that country. 
 
Lastly, we should mention a certain limitation of this study. Due to the rather limited 
availability of adequate dependent variables in the data set used, we could not give a 
complete picture of the integration process of school-leavers into the labour market.  
Firstly, information on wages is lacking. Secondly, job match or skill use 
characteristics are missing. For instance, it was not possible to determine whether 
the actual level of education held by school-leavers fits with the level of education 
requested by the job (‘overeducation’). Thirdly, information on labour mobility is not 
available. Since school-leavers often start in jobs that do not match their education, 
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job mobility is considerable among school-leavers. Therefore, in future research it 
would be very interesting to investigate whether national institutional contexts affect 
these other indicators of youth labour market integration. However, this kind of 
information requires other comparative data sources that are unfortunately not 
available (yet). 
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Appendix: the interpretation of posterior means 
Suppose that we have a group of three countries and that we are interested in the 
proportion of temporarily employed school-leavers in these countries. In Country A, 
temporary employment among school-leavers is 30 percent; in Country B 10 percent 
and in Country C 5 percent. Furthermore, the overall level of temporary employment 
in these three countries is 15 percent. The gross performance of each country, in 
terms of posterior means, can be expressed as the predicted percentage difference 
for this country from the overall percentage of temporarily employed school-leavers 
(see Model 0 in Figure A.1). So, in Country A the posterior mean is 30 - 15 = 15. In 
Country B this value is -5 and in Country C it is -10. In other words, a posterior mean 
is a relative performance measure that reflects the performance of a country in 
relation to the average performance of all countries. 
 
Figure A.1 
Example of cross-country performance with regard to having a temporary job 
 
Suppose next that the general labour market situation is good in Country C and bad 
in Country A. The labour market situation in Country B takes an intermediate 
position. The interesting question then is to investigate to what extent the observed 
cross-country variation in temporary employment among school-leavers (i.e. Model 
0) can be ascribed to these differences in the general labour market situation. In 
other words, what we want to know is how the three countries differ in their 
performance with regard to temporary employment if we were in the fictitious 
situation that the general labour market situation in these countries is the same. 
Statistically speaking, we need to control in the analysis for the differences in the 
general labour market situation between countries and see to what extent the cross-
country variation in temporary employment can be reduced (or statistically explained) 
by including this variable in the analysis. Model 1 of Figure A.1 displays the posterior 
means, obtained after taking the effect of the general labour market situation into 
account. It can be concluded from this model that the variation across countries has 
decreased, since the original variation (simply measured as the absolute difference 
between the highest and lowest performance score) was 25 (15 + 10) percent in 
Model 0 and 10 percent in Model 1. This result indicates that the general labour 
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market situation in a country affects indeed the proportion of temporary employment 
in that country. For Country A, the posterior mean now takes the value 5, which 
means a reduction of 10 percentage points (15 - 5 = 10). This finding implies that two 
thirds of the original low performance of Country A can be explained by its bad labour 
market situation. In other words, school-leavers of this country hold a temporary job 
relatively often, because the overall labour market situation in Country A is so bad. 
For Country C a similar, but opposite interpretation is valid. The original performance 
score declines from -10 to -5, indicating that half of the advantageous position of this 
country can be attributed to its good labour market situation. For Country B, the 
posterior mean has not changed at all. This result can be interpreted as an indication 
that the general labour market situation of this country equals the average labour 
market situation of all three countries, and therefore it has no effect on its relative 
performance with regard to temporary employment. 
 
Model 2 of Figure A.1 shows the posterior means of the analysis in which, besides 
the general labour market situation of a country, the degree of vocational specificity 
of the education system is statistically controlled for. For this example, we assume 
that the vocational orientation of the education system is high in Country C and low in 
Country A. Again, Country B takes a position in the middle. In fact, the performance 
scores displayed in this model reflect the country differences in temporary 
employment in the case of an equal labour market situation and an equally strong 
vocational specificity of the education system in all three countries. We see that the 
cross-country variation further decreases, indicating that differences in the vocational 
specificity of education systems explain to some extent differences in performance 
with regard to temporary employment, ceteris paribus. Moreover, it can be concluded 
from Model 2 that the ranking of the countries has changed. This can be explained as 
follows. A part of the bad performance of Country A must be attributed to its low 
vocational orientation of the education system. For Country C the reverse is true: part 
of this country’s good performance must be explained by the high vocational 
orientation of its education system. For Country B this also is true, but since in this 
country the vocational orientation of the education system is less strong than in 
Country C, the ‘net’ performance is better. In a situation of equal labour market 
conditions and equally strong vocational orientation of education systems, Country B 
would perform better (i.e. has a smaller proportion of school-leavers being in a 
temporary job) than Country C. 
 
How can we interpret the results of this example for benchmarking or policy-making? 
The basic message is simply that gross performance is not the same as net 
performance. Normally, we would look at gross outcomes and conclude that Country 
C has the best performance and Country A the worst. However, this does not tell us 
anything about the factors behind these differences. Do they have to do with 
differences in the general labour market situation of the country, or with institutional 
differences such as the vocational orientation of the education system? The 
methodological approach followed here enables us to conclude that a large part of 
the differences between the countries are explained by differences in the general 
labour market situation. More important for policy-making, however, is the finding that 
the vocational orientation of the education system affects the performance of a 
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country. The policy implication based on this example would be to enlarge the 
vocational orientation of the education system. In terms of benchmarking, Country B 
seems an interesting case, more interesting at least than Country C. After all, the 
performance of Country B is better than would be predicted on the basis of its 
general labour market situation and the vocational orientation of its education 
system. The implication is that there is something else to be learnt from Country B. 
 
  
